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This thesis estimates the willingness of farmers under the Bontanga Irrigation Scheme 
(BIS) in Northern Ghana to pay for improved irrigation services. The Contingent Valuation 
Method (CVM) was used in this study and farmers were randomly selected for interviewing 
based on the location of their farms (upstream, middle, and downstream) within the scheme. The 
payment card elicitation format was used and the data were analyzed using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure that is capable of accommodating the intervals in 
payment card data.  The mean willingness to pay was found to be GHC 16.32 (US$ 8.50) per ha 
per year and the median was GHC 14.00 (US$ 7.29) per ha per year.  
Tobit regression model was also used to estimate the mean number of labor days farmers 
under the scheme would be willing to contribute to improve the project. The mean labor days 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to estimate willingness of the beneficiary farmers of 
the Bontanga Irrigation Scheme (BIS) in Northern Ghana to pay for improved irrigation using 
contingent valuation method (CVM). The steps involve surveying the representative sample of 
the total number of farmers based on the locations of their farms (upstream, middle, and 
downstream) in the scheme. The payment card (PC) method is used to elicit the farmers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) and the results are analyzed to determine the relationship between 
WTP and other variables that affect demand including the characteristics of the respondents 
using the Maximum Likelihood interval techniques. 
 
1.1 Overview of Impacts of Rain-fed Agriculture on the Economy of Ghana 
Agriculture is the main source of employment in Ghana. It accounts for the largest share 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Ghana. However, its share of the GDP declined from 
over 44 percent in 1990 to about 37 percent in 2005 (MOFA, 2007),  to about 31 percent in 2009, 
and further down to about 30.2 percent in 2010 (MOFA, 2011; World Bank, 2012). One would 
have thought that the decline in agriculture’s share of the GDP is due to increases in output from 
other sectors (industries and services), but that is not the case. Agriculture’s GDP growth rate in 
2007 decreased by 1.7% and that of crops sector contribution to agriculture’s share of the GDP 
decreased by 1.3%. And from 2009 to 2010, agriculture’s GDP growth rate decreased by about 
26% and the crops sector contribution decreased by about 50% (GSS, 2011). Several factors 
contribute to the gradual decline of the agricultural productivity in Ghana and the over-
dependence of the country on rain-fed agriculture may be one of them.  
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The average annual rainfall in Ghana ranges from 800mm to 2400mm and said to vary on 
inter-annual and inter-decadal timescales. The Northern part of the country registers the lowest 
annual rainfall while the southern part of the country registers the highest annual rainfall. The 
entire country has two major seasons, rainy and dry. The Northern part has two seasons, the 
rainy season which starts somewhere in April and ends somewhere in mid September, followed 
by a prolonged dry season. The southern part has two rainy seasons: from April to June, and 
from early September to ending of October. Due to variations in the annual rainfall of Ghana, 
reliance on rain-fed agriculture can contribute to the economic decline of the country. Among the 
expected consequences of climate change, crop yield from rain-fed agriculture in most African 
countries is expected to decrease by 50% by the year 2020 (IPCC, 2007). To mitigate this 
expected consequence of global change, not just irrigation but improved irrigation is necessary to 
supplement the commonly rain-fed crop production in Africa including Ghana. And also, for 
Ghana to achieve solid economic growth, reduce poverty, and ensure food security, the 
agricultural production in Ghana should not be solely rain-fed.  
 
1.2 Overview of Irrigation Schemes in Ghana 
Establishments of public irrigation projects in Ghana date back to the 1960s (Kyei-
Baffour and Ofori, 2006). The irrigation schemes were initially established and managed by the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA). In 1977, the Ghana Irrigation Development 
Authority (GIDA) was set up by the government for the responsibility of establishing, managing, 
and maintaining public irrigation schemes. As of 2011, GIDA constructed 22 public irrigation 
projects in the whole country, covering a developed total land area of more than 6,500 hectares 
(MOFA, 2011). Another 22 irrigation schemes have been constructed under the Small Scale 
3 
 
Irrigation Development Project (SSIDP), and 6 schemes under the Small Farms Irrigation Project 
(SFIP). Almost all of the rest of the 28 irrigation projects are small and none covers a total land 
area of more than 1000 hectares (MOFA, 2011).  
The irrigation potential of Ghana is estimated to be between 0.36 and 2.9 million hectares 
(Namara et al., 2010) which is known to be highly underutilized. Table 1.1 summarizes the 
developed and irrigated land areas of public irrigation schemes in Ghana. It shows that, even 
with an estimated developed land area of about 9000 hectares for the public irrigation projects, 
the level of utilization was about 60% as at 2003 and has even gone worst in recent years. Also, 
majority of these public irrigation projects are either not functioning properly, or their 
beneficiaries who are indigenous small-scale farmers always complain of low outputs. The 
public irrigation projects in Ghana can best be characterized by lack of maintenance and 
abandonment. 
 The irrigation systems in Ghana also lack improvements in terms of irrigation 
technology and availability of irrigation facilities, rendering farmers’ unwillingness to invest in 
irrigated farming. Irrigation charges for the public irrigation schemes are low (25 GHC per ha 
per season in the case of Bontanga) which are often not even collected because most farmers do 
not pay them. Underinvestment in the maintenance of the public irrigation schemes leads to 
eroded dams/reservoir walls, blocked canals and laterals, and siltation, which is a common 
problem in the gravity type irrigation systems. The lack of improvements or underinvestment in 
the irrigation systems in Ghana affects the efficiency and sustainability of the irrigation schemes. 
The poor nature of public irrigation schemes in Ghana including poor irrigation technology, lack  
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utilization Irrigation type Target crop Remarks 
1 Ashaiman 155 56 36.13 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
2 Dawhenya 200 150 75.00 Gravity & pump Rice   
3 Kpong 2,786 616 22.11 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
4 Weija 220 0 0.00 Pump Vegetables 
Abandoned 2003- 
Rehabilitated 
5 Afife 880 880 100.00 Gravity Rice     
6 Aveyme  60 0 0.00 Gravity Rice 
Abandoned 1998- 
Rehabilitated 
7 Kpando Torkor 40 6 15.00 Pump Vegetables   
8 Mankessim 17 17 100.00 Pump Vegetables   
9 Okyereko 81 42 51.85 Gravity Rice   
10 Subinja 60 6 10.00 Pump Vegetables   
11 Tanoso 64 15 23.44 Pump Vegetables   
12 Sata 34 24 70.59 Gravity Vegetables   
13 Akumadan 65 0 0.00 Pump Vegetables Abandoned - Rehabilitated 
14 Anum Valley 89 0 0.00 Gravity & pump Rice Abandoned - Rehabilitated 
15 Amate 101 0 0.00 Pump Rice Abandoned 
16 Dedeso 20 8 40.00 Pump Vegetables   
17 Kikam 27 0 0.00 Gracity & pump Rice Abandoned 
18 Bontanga 450 390 86.67 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
19 Golinga 40 16 40.00 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
20 Libga 16 16 100.00 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
21 Tono 2,490 2,450 98.39 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
22 Vea 850 500 58.82 Gravity Rice and vegetables   
  Total 8745 5192 59.37       
        Source:  Miyoshi and Nagayo 2006, cited in Namara et al., (2010).  Modified by author 
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of proper management, lack of maintenance, lack of irrigation facilities, as well as the lower 
irrigation charges render them unproductive.  
 
1.3 Management of Irrigation Schemes in Ghana 
 Until 1990, all public irrigation projects were managed solely by GIDA. But due to low 
staff capacity and higher operation and maintenance costs, GIDA was not always able to manage 
the irrigation projects successfully. The government then introduced Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PIM) followed by the Joint Irrigation System Management (JISM) in the 1990s. 
PIM and JISM were both introduced as measures to reduce government costs in operation and 
maintenance of the irrigation schemes and also to help improve them. PIM and JISM are 
technically the same in that each management framework requires the beneficiary farmers or the 
Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs) to be stakeholders in the management of the irrigation 
projects. Through PIM/JISM, irrigation service charges paid by the beneficiary farmers are used 
directly for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation projects.  
Currently, the Bontanga Irrigation Scheme practices JISM as the management system but 
is in a position to change the management system into Public Private Partnership system (PPP), 
after the system is satisfactorily improved. As the name implies, the irrigation system will be 
managed by both public (the FBOs), GIDA, and at least a large private farmer who will help 
with the provision of irrigation facilities, marketing of produce from the scheme, operation and 
maintenance of the project, and several other benefits will be provided in order to help the 
scheme achieve its goals of poverty reduction.  
The main sources of funding to public irrigation schemes in Ghana are from the 
government and from the collection of irrigation service charges (ISC) from farmers. The ISCs 
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in Ghana are usually very low depending on the type of irrigation. Gravity type irrigation charges 
are much lower than pump type irrigation charges. The Bontanga Irrigation Scheme (BIS) is a 
gravity type and its current irrigation service charge is GHC 50 (US$ 26.04)
1
 per ha per year. 
 
1.4. Importance of Irrigation in Northern Ghana 
The northern part of Ghana is the driest part of the country. It records lower annual 
rainfall and has fewer river basins as compared to the south. It accounts for the highest rural 
population in the country, characterized by poverty, higher level of illiteracy, and unemployment 
(World Bank, 1995). The northern part of Ghana comprises the Upper East, Upper West, and the 
Northern regions. The Northern region is one of the largest regions in Ghana and has vast arable 
land which is suitable for irrigation. In addition to the Upper East and the Upper West regions, 
the land area available for irrigation is capable of producing larger quantities of rice and 
vegetables which do very well in these regions. As part of government goals to create rural 
employment, reduce poverty, and ensure food security, it is prudent for the government to 
establish more irrigation projects and also improve the existing ones in the 3 northern regions. 
The regions can boast of very few public irrigation schemes of which BIS is the largest. 
BIS was established by GIDA in the early 1980s. It is simply an earthen dam with water 
supplied by gravity to the farmlands. The reservoir of the scheme is said to be capable of storing 
25 million cubic meters (about 20,268 acre feet) of water, and supposed to irrigate about 495 
hectares at a time (MOFA, 2011) which it does not really do due to lack of improvement. The 
irrigation system has just been rehabilitated (without any major improvements in the irrigation 
technology) by the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) in 2011, for the first time in 30 
years of its existence. The system is not capable of sustaining the water needs of the farmers 
                                                          
1
 1 US Dollar traded for about GHC 1.92 as of August 25, 2012. 
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because of the kind of irrigation method and lack of regular maintenance, making water supply 
to the farmlands inefficient due to distribution, application and delivery losses. To increase 
efficiency, it would be better to improve the irrigation system:  Support the gravity flow with 
pump, fix and replace the current gates with well designed gates for proper control of turnouts at 
laterals, install standard weirs at every turnout for proper measuring of flows, provide more 
irrigation facilities including machinery (tractors, combine harvesters, dredging machines and so 
on), and implement regular maintenance of the irrigation project.  Improvement of the scheme is 
possible if farmers will be willing to assist in recovering the costs that will result from the 
improvement. Thus the improvement is not necessarily about increasing the quantity of water as 
much as reliability and complementary capital to raise the marginal productivity of the farmer. 
BIS current irrigation service charge per hectare per year is very low and management of 
BIS is suggesting an increase in irrigation charges from 50GHC (US$ 26.04) per ha per year to 
about 246GHC (US$ 125.13) per ha per year to recover the cost of improving the systems and 
also for operation and maintenance (MiDA, 2011).. This proposal requires about 392 percent 
increase in the irrigation charges which is supposed to be done in a form of smaller increments 
annually. The management wishes to improve the irrigation system as well as acquire irrigation 
facilities which will help the farmers in their crop production. So this thesis will try to elicit the 
maximum amount each farmer will be willing to pay per hectare per year assuming the irrigation 
system is improved and the PPP management system is in place. 
The outcome of this thesis will be used by the management of the BIS to determine the 
ISCs that will be collected annually for both the improvement and the operation and regular 
maintenance of the project. The results will also be used by other similar public schemes within 
and beyond the region to determine their ISCs assuming their schemes are improved. 
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The chapters of this thesis are arranged as follows: chapter one is introduction, chapter 
two is literature review, chapter three is methodology, chapter four presents the results and 























CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Alternative Approaches to Valuing Irrigation Water 
 Most of the studies to value irrigation projects are centered on valuing the irrigation 
water. This may be from the fact that water is one of the main inputs in irrigation. And because 
water is generally a nonmarket good, nonmarket valuation approaches are widely used to value 
irrigation water. In situations where market prices of goods and services are nonexistent, 
economic values of these goods and services can be obtained through the use of non-market 
valuation techniques (Bateman and Turner, 1992; Young, 2005). Valuation of irrigation water as 
a nonmarket good can be grouped into two broad techniques which are deductive and inductive, 
and each technique is identified based on the mathematical procedures and the types of data used 
in the analysis (Young, 2005).  
The deductive technique employs the use of mathematical programming which 
incorporates crop production functions and forecasts of input and output prices in order to model 
the behavior of the profit-maximizing farmer (Young, 2005; Medellin-Azuara et al., 2010, 
Qureshi et al. 2010). According to Young (2005), the deductive technique is a very flexible way 
of valuing irrigation water because it can fit into different policy options, economic and 
technological scenarios. However, its accuracy depends on the validity of the data and the 
suitability of the chosen model. An example of the most commonly used deductive technique is 
the residual imputation method (Young, 2005; Qureshi et al. 2010). The residual imputation 
approach requires that, the costs of all inputs except that of water are deducted from the total 
crop revenue resulting in the estimated value of water. The estimated value of the water is 
accurate only if the prices and the quantities of the other inputs are estimated correctly at their 
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marginal values. Specification of production functions is a problem and may also affect the 
results from the residual imputation method. The deductive approach is not suitable for this 
paper because of data problems and difficulty in the choice of production functions.  
 Inductive techniques use econometric models to analyze data obtained from observations 
of water market transactions (prices of water rights or land and water rights transactions), survey 
responses, or from observed secondary data (Young, 2005; Qureshi et al. 2010). Inductive 
techniques are good because they reflect empirical data and its results are more reliable (Young, 
2005; Medellin-Azuara et al. 2010). Dependence on large, quality datasets makes it a more data-
intensive approach (Medellin-Azuara et al. 2010). Young (2005) also explains that, the accuracy 
of the inductive approach depends on the validity and the representativeness of the data used in 
the analysis, the variables selected, and the suitability of the functional form. Inductive 
techniques are observation-based approaches under which we can categorize the revealed and the 
stated preference methods of valuing irrigation water.  
Revealed preference approaches are those that utilize data from actual choices including 
water market transactions, while the stated preference approaches are not observed but from 
surveys that ask respondents about their choices of the intended resources (Young, 2005; Qureshi 
et al. 2010; Boyle, 2003). Examples of the revealed preference approaches include travel cost 
method (TCM), hedonic property valuation (HPM), defensive behavior and damage costs 
(Boyle, 2003). Boyle (2003) describes the TCM as being used for recreational activities, while 
the defensive behavior and damage costs method is used to account for what respondents pay to 
“offset effects of exposure”.  Therefore, both the TCM and the defensive behavior and benefit 
costs methods are not suitable for irrigation water valuation. HPM reveals the implicit price of 
water in irrigation. It is used to determine how water rights for irrigation affect the price of a 
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particular land, by considering the attributes of the land as well as land market transactions data 
in order to econometrically estimate parameters for the determinants of land price (Medellin-
Azuara et al. 2010). Faux and Perry (1999) estimated irrigation water value in Malheur County, 
Oregon, using the HPM. They used all sales of agricultural property in the Treasure Valley 
during the years 1991 through 1995. The variables chosen by Faux and Perry (1999) were sale 
price, acreage, soil classification for each acre, location of property, date of sale, number of acres 
and source of irrigation supply, number of residential lots permitted, and estimated value of 
buildings. The median size of the properties was 78 acres with a median price of $1,394. The 
value of irrigation water on a least productive land was estimated at $9 per acre-foot and that on 
the most productive land was estimated at $44 per acre-foot. The hedonic price does not account 
for the soil quality which makes it less accurate (Faux and Perry, 1999). HPM is not suitable for 
the BIS study area because land market transactions data are not available. An example of the 
stated preference approach used in valuing irrigation water which is suitable for the BIS study 
area is the contingent valuation method (CVM). In the CVM, the individual’s WTP is only stated 
as a response to the survey question and not observed. 
 
2.2 The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) 
The CVM is a method used to determine individual’s demand for a nonmarket good. It 
requires individuals to state their preferences for the non-market resource through their responses 
to WTP questions concerning the existing resource or one that is yet to be provided (Cameron 
and Huppert, 1989; Bateman and Turner, 1992; Portney, 1994; Boyle, 2003).  The CVM was 
first introduced in 1947 in Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) but fully implemented in Davis (1963) to 
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estimate the value of a recreational area to hunters and wilderness lovers (Portney, 1994; Boyle, 
2003), and later recommended by the NOAA Panel (1993).  
The CVM is a recognized and widely used non-market valuation technique (Cameron and 
Huppert, 1989; Ready et al., 1996). In developing countries, CV surveys were originally applied 
in water supply and other environmental benefits estimation, and are much easier and very 
straight forward to conduct because the respondents take it more serious than in the 
industrialized countries (Whittington, 1998).The CVM is better as compared to the HPM method 
because it is suitable in eliciting both use and non-use values (Kramer and Eisen-Hecht, 2002; 
World Bank, 2002), and when there is no observable data that are available for the policy option 
to be analyzed (World Bank, 2002). CVM is also good because it allows accounts of the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents (Portney, 1994). The CVM is used for this 
study because there is no observed data that are already available to help in the valuation of BIS. 
And also, the project is not yet improved so CVM will serve as the best method to value it since 
CVM can be used to value resources that are yet to be provided. 
As proposed by Bateman and Turner (1992), and Boyle (2003), a good CVM survey 
questionnaire should include an introductory part that will help the respondent to understand 
what the survey is about, the non-market good should be well described and how it will be 
provided, the payment vehicle should be well defined (and should be what the respondent is 
familiar with), there should be a decision rule, the provider of the non-market good should be 
stated, and any other information including the method/format that will assist in the elicitation of 
the WTP.  NOAA Panel (1993) also recommend following guidelines for survey design and 
implementation in order to come out with reliable CVM results. The survey can be face-to-face 
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interviews, mail in, or telephone interviews. The survey described in this paper will use face-to-
face interviews because both the telephone and the mailing systems are not effective in the area. 
 There are different elicitation formats that can be used in a CVM survey: open ended 
questions, closed ended questions, dichotomous choice (single, double, or multiple bounded), 
bidding game, and the payment card (Boyle et al. 1996; Boyle, 2003; Carson and Hanemann, 
2005). All the elicitation formats have their advantages and disadvantages but Loomis (1990) 
and Boyle et al. (1996) have both concluded that, there is no significant difference between the 
open-ended and the dichotomous choice elicitation formats, and that both formats produce 
reliable results. The open ended question asks the respondent how much he/she will be willing to 
pay for the good while the closed ended gives options from which the respondent chooses how 
much he/she is willing to pay. The dichotomous choice format requires the respondent to answer 
“yes” or “no” to a specific payment (Alberini et. al, 1999). It is used widely in developing 
countries (FAO, 2000) but Whittington (1998) revealed that the variation of bids across 
individuals pose problems in tightly-knit communities such as those in developing countries. The 
dichotomous choice, according to Ready et al. (1996), has problems including starting point bias, 
uncertainty, inconsistence and strong assumptions.  
The payment card elicitation format is used for this paper. It was first introduced by 
Mitchell and Carson (1981). The payment card consists of an ordered list of maximum WTP 
values on a card (Mitchell and Carson, 1981; Cameron and Huppert, 1987; Cameron and 
Huppert, 1989; Rowe et al. 1996). The respondent is asked to select only one choice on the card 
as his/her maximum willingness to pay value. Respondents who select zero are asked a protest 
bid question. The reason for the protest bid question is to find out if the respondent has other 
reasons for not willing to pay for the resource. 
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In the payment card, it is assumed that the bid selected by an individual is the lower 
bound of his or her willingness to pay, and the individual’s true WTP bid lies between the 
selected bid and the next higher bid (Cameron and Huppert, 1989). These sounds similar to what 
one would expect farmers under BIS to behave if faced with different ISCs from which they 
should choose from and will therefore work well in our situation. 
There are also problems with the payment card including range and centering biases 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1986) but Rowe et al. (1996) proposed that those problems can be 
minimized or totally eliminated provided an exponential payment scale is used with no 
truncation problem. The payment card approach is identified to conserve effort and also avoid 
higher non-response rate as compared to open-ended approach (Cameron and Huppert, 1989). 
The difficulty with the use of payment card in the survey area is that, some of the respondents 
have no formal education to be able to scan through and circle their bids and will need to be 
prompted by the interviewer. The PC approach is still suitable for the study area because, in the 
PC approach, all respondents receive the same bids which will curb the problem of distrust in the 
survey that might arise from variations in bid amounts across individuals. 
 
2.3 Previous CVM Studies on Valuation of Irrigation 
  Most of the CVM studies conducted in developing countries including Whittington et al. 
(1991),  Bohm et al. (1993), and Hsu et al. (1990) are on WTP for drinking water under 
improved water supply conditions, and very few of them are on valuation of irrigation. 
Considering CVM surveys conducted in developing countries which are most comparable to this 
paper, Weldesilassie et al. (2009), Chandrasekaran et al. (2009), Akter (2007), Basarir et al. 
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(2009), and Storm et al. (2010)  have each estimated the economic value of irrigation water or 
improved irrigation under different CVM scenarios.  
Weldesilassie et al. (2009) estimated the economic value of improved wastewater 
irrigation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. They used the CVM to assess the value farmers attach to the 
safe use of wastewater in irrigation. Their survey was conducted on farm households that used 
freshwater and also on those that used wastewater for irrigation within and around Addis Ababa. 
The double–bounded dichotomous choice format with an open-ended follow-up question was 
used to elicit the respondents’ WTP for the improved or safe use of wastewater for crop 
production. The payment vehicle in Weldesilassie et al. (2009) was implemented in a form of 
annual water charge per hectare per year paid by the respondent immediately after harvest, which 
makes their study very similar to this paper. A total of 415 sample farm households were 
targeted for use in their study, comprising 175 farm households that used freshwater for 
irrigation and the other 240 were farm households that used wastewater for irrigation. But 372 
households were used in the analysis due to non-responses during the face to face interviews. Of 
the 372 farmers, wastewater farmers were 223 and freshwater farmers were 149. Their survey 
results revealed that about 98% of the freshwater irrigators were willing to contribute to improve 
the existing irrigation practice while 90% of the wastewater farmers were willing to contribute. 
They used a standard probit, bivariate probit, and interval-data models to estimate WTP for the 
improved wastewater irrigation. The standard probit was used for only responses to the initial 
bids (single-bounded dichotomous choice) and the other two models were used for the full 
responses to the double-bounded dichotomous choices questions. Weldesilassie et al. (2009) 
estimated the mean WTP from the single-bounded model as ETB 39.57 (US$ 3.44) per hectare 
per year, ETB 39.10 (US$ 3.40) per hectare per year from the bivariate-probit model, ETB 39.72 
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(US$ 3.45) from the interval-data model, and ETB 35.35 (US$ 3.07) from the open follow up 
question. They found very little protesting behavior during their survey. Their results showed 
that location of farm, education, number of years with irrigation experience, and total annual 
yield value significantly influenced WTP. Based on the quality of their results, they suggested 
using the interval data model as the best to achieve more efficient estimates of WTP for 
improvement of programs. 
Chandrasekaran et al. (2009) estimated farmers’ WTP for irrigation water in the Tamil 
Nadu State in India. They used CVM to study farmers’ WTP for tank irrigation water under 
improved water supply conditions during wet and dry seasons of paddy cultivation. They 
randomly selected 31 tanks from the Tamil Nadu State. And 62 respondents were drawn from the 
dependents of those 31 tanks. The survey was face to face interviews made up of both closed and 
open-ended questions. Farmers were asked whether or not they would be willing to pay a 
specific amount for tank irrigated water (close-ended) or how much they would be willing to pay 
for tank irrigated water (open-ended) under improved levels of water supply during dry and wet 
seasons. The payment vehicle was in the form of irrigation charges per hectare per year which 
also makes Chandrasekaran et al. (2009) similar to this thesis. They used the standard logit 
model to analyze the results. Their study revealed the mean value of farmers’ WTP for water 
supplied by tank irrigation as 218.50 Indian Rupees (US$ 4.46) per ha per year. They found land 
area and where requirement of the crops to be significant. Their results also revealed that farmers 
were willing to pay for the irrigation water but the WTP values were considerably low 
In Bangladesh, Akter (2007) determined the value of irrigation water in a government 
managed small scale irrigation project in the Homna sub-district. He used CVM to elicit farmers’ 
WTP for the irrigation water under the government managed small scale irrigation project. The 
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CVM scenario in his study was “government managed” since most irrigation schemes in the 
study area were managed by private sectors. The payment vehicle was irrigation charges per 
decimal land area per cropping season. Single bounded closed ended WTP with follow up protest 
bid questions were used in his face to face interviews on 300 farmers in the study area. And the 
data from 257 valid respondents were analyzed using standard logit model. The mean WTP was 
estimated to be 1670 Taka (US$ 27.83)  per kani (30 decimal) land area per season (four 
months). His results revealed that age, education, family size, number of income sources, 
ownership of farm land have significant impacts on WTP. And that farmers’ WTP were high for 
areas of higher water scarcity. 
Basarir et al. (2009) analyzed vegetable producers’ WTP for high quality irrigation water 
in the Turhal and Suluova regions in Turkey. They used CVM by randomly selecting 130 
producers from both regions on whom they conducted face to face interviews. They used open 
ended questions and a large amount of the respondents reported zero bids. Torbit and Heckman 
sample selection models were used in their study and the mean WTP was estimated as1 TL (US$ 
0.63)  per decare per day. Their results revealed gender and water quality to be significant. 
Storm et al. (2010) also estimated farmers’ demand for irrigation water in the Middle Draa 
Valley in Morocco using CVM. They gathered information from 63 farmers out of 95 farmers 
interviewed. They adjusted the CVM to estimate the demand for irrigation water along farmer’s 
willingness to pay for one more unit of surface water or groundwater. Tobit regression was used 








) during winter and summer, respectively. They found knowledge of farmers 
demand for irrigation water to be important and recommend CVM as a reasonable method for 
areas with limited data availability.  
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Other CVM studies in developing countries which are to some extent related to this paper 
in terms of methodology are on valuation of drinking water supply services. But their results 
cannot be directly compared to that of CVM studies on valuation of irrigation water.  We will 
have a brief look at Whittington et al. (1990) and Casey et al. (2005). Whittington et al. (1990) 
estimated willingness to pay for water services in Laurent, a rural community in Haiti. Face-to-
face interview was used to elicit WTP from 170 households out of 225 households in the 
community. The bidding game format was used and the mean WTP was estimated to be 5.7 
gourdes (US$ 1.14) per month. Whittington et al. (1990) recommended the use of photographs or 
visual aids in contingent valuation surveys, and added that developing countries are likely to 
produce high-quality CVM surveys than in industrialized countries. Casey et al. (2005) estimated 
WTP for improved water services in Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil. In their study, WTP was 
elicited from 1625 households within 6 low-income communities in the area using both open-
ended (with and without introductory paragraph) and bidding game approach (ascending and 
descending), totaling 4 different elicitation formats. The mean WTP from their study was R$11 
(US$ 5.61) per month. Casey et al. (2005) found that respondents were willing to pay more for 
drinking water than the current charges. 
 
2.4 Analysis of Payment Card (PC) Data 
 
 2.4.1 The Theoretical Model 
Through a CV survey, we try to assign value to the nonmarket good that is provided. Flores 
(2003) explains that cost is incurred in the provision of the nonmarket good and to recover the 
cost of providing the good, we need to consider the amount of income an individual will give up 
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after the project is implemented to keep his/her utility constant  - the compensating variation. In 
the case of BIS, the compensating variation can be explained using the equation below: 
 
(1)   v(Po, Qo, y) = v(P1, Q1, y - C) 
 
where v(.) is the indirect utility function, P
o
 is the current ISC, P
1 
is the ISC after the project is 
improved, Q
o
 is the current situation of the project, Q
1 
is the improved project, y is the income of 
the farmer, and C is the compensating variation which is the WTP bid of the farmer. 
 
2.4.2 The Empirical Models 
           In the PC data analysis, the respondent’s true WTP, which is denoted Yi, in (2), is assumed 
to be in the interval between the selected WTP, C as in (1), and the next highest WTP value on 
the PC (Cameron and Huppert, 1989; Hackl and Pruckner, 1999; Boyle, 2003). So in using the 
PC data to estimate average values or to estimate relationships between WTP and the variables 
that affect the WTP, the interval midpoints are used (Cameron and Huppert, 1989). Cameron and 
Huppert (1989) also add that, valuation is non-negative and that the lognormal conditional 
distribution for valuations can serve as useful first approximations.  
            Following Cameron and Huppert (1989), Yi  lies within lower and upper thresholds Bli 
and Bui, then (logYi ) lies between( logBli) and (logBui). The E(logYi|xi)  is a function of g(xi, β). 
Where xi is the vector of the independent variables of an individual and β is the vector of the 
coefficients to be estimated. To estimate β, we use the function: 
 
(2)         (logYi  ) =    
 β + ui 
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where   
 
  and  β  are the same as above, and ui  is the random error term assumed to be 
distributed normally with mean 0 and the standard deviation, σ.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure can first be used to estimate (2) above using the 
logarithm of the midpoints of the WTP bids as the dependent variables. But the OLS in payment 
card data analysis yields biased parameter estimates, the effects of the variables on the resource 
value can be wrongly inferred, and it can also create biases in the overall resource value 
(Cameron and Huppert, 1989). To get a more appropriate estimation procedure, we proceed with 
the fact that Yi is only stated by the respondent and not observed. Its probability falls within the 
interval and can be expressed in the form:  
 
(3)        Pr(Yi ⊆ (Bli, Bui) = Pr((logBli -   
 β)/ σ < zi < (logBui -   
 β)/ σ) 
 
where  zi is the standard normal random variable. The probability in (3) can be expressed as a 
difference between two standard normal cumulative density functions, zli for the lower bound 
and  zui  for the upper bound in (3). Then (3) can be rewritten in the form φ(zui) – φ(zli). Where φ 
is the cumulative standard normal density function. Interpreting the joint probability density 
function for n independent observations as a likelihood function defined over β and σ, the log-
likelihood function is written as: 
 
(4)          logL =             φ(Zui) – φ(Zli)] 
 
Equation (4) is then estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
procedure, as the most efficient and priori superior method that can accommodate the intervals of 
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PC data (Cameron and Huppert, 1989). Equation (4) is therefore the model employed by this 
paper and the MLE is used to estimate the parameters of the PC interval data.  
 To compute the mean and the median WTP values, the fitted values of logYi are first 
constructed after the regressions. So the conditional mean of logYi is expressed in the form   
 β, 
and exp(  
 β) is used to retransform logYi into Y, which represents the median WTP value 
(Cameron and Huppert, 1989). Cameron and Huppert (1989) also suggest that, the mean of Y, is 
computed by scaling the median by exp(σ
2



















CHAPTER THREE: STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter briefly describes the BIS and the survey area, outlines the steps in planning 
the study, designing and implementation of the survey. 
 
3.1 The BIS and the Survey Area 
In figure 3.1 is a map of Northern Ghana districts and BIS is located in the 
Tolon/Kumbungu district. The BIS is a public irrigation scheme which was constructed in 1983 
by the Government of the Republic of Ghana. It is a gravity fed irrigation system consisting of an 
earthen dam/reservoir with two take-offs and a spillway. The reservoir’s capacity is 25.00 Mm
3 
(about 20,268 acre feet) (MOFA, 2011). The currently developed land area for irrigation is 570 
ha out of the irrigation capacity of 800 ha. The scheme has a total number of 525 farmers from 
13 different communities with an average land holding of about 0.6 ha per farmer. The farmers 
are organized into a cooperative made of 10 farmer based organizations (FBOs). The main 
objectives of the irrigation scheme are to provide employment for the youth in the catchment 
areas, and to enable farmers in the catchment areas to have access to all year round crop 
production. The main crops grown under the scheme are rice and vegetables. 
BIS and most of its beneficiary farmers are located in the Tolon/Kumbugu District. The 





 32 N and longitudes 0
o
 45E and 0
o
 93W, and located in the Guinea 
Savanna vegetation. The region has a relatively dry climate with only one rainy season, from 
May to September which is followed by a prolonged dry season.  The amount of annual rainfall 
recorded for the region is between 750 mm and 1050 mm.  
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Figure 3.1 Map of the Northern Ghana Districts. 
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Northern_Ghana_districts.png  
 
 
3.2 Initial Planning of the Study 
The initial planning of this study started in Fall 2011 in order to estimate the willingness 
of the farmers under the BIS to pay for improved irrigation. In 2011, BIS was rehabilitated by 
the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) at the cost of about GHC 5 million (US$ 3 
million). MiDA resurfaced the main and the lateral roads on the existing 570 hectares of 
developed land, dredged the drainage system, renovated 6 farm buildings, provided 33 new 
threshing floors, and 9 maintenance sheds. The next plan is to expand the developed land area to 
cover the irrigation potential of the scheme, and also to improve the irrigation system which is 
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already discussed in chapter one. For the improvement of the scheme to take place, GIDA will 
have to increase the ISCs of the farmers to cover the operation and the maintenance cost of the 
project.  This study will therefore conduct a CV survey to come out with a realistic ISC value for 
the scheme. 
The outcome of this survey will be used by the management of the BIS to determine the 
revenue that will be available to the scheme annually. The outcome will also be used by other 
similar public schemes within and beyond the region to determine their ISCs assuming their 
schemes are improved. 
 
3.3 Data Needs: Sampling Methodology and Sampling Location 
 After identifying the need to conduct this study, the communities within which the 
farmers reside were first identified but ended up being more scattered within the catchment area.  
The study was designed to be conducted based on the locations of the farmlands within the 
scheme. It did not matter if more than one individual farmer of the same household were selected 
during the interview process because farmers were selected based on the location of their farms 
not based on households. What mattered was the farmer has a land in the scheme and he/she is 
randomly selected to take part based on his/her plot of land. The main point was to ensure that 
the data collected would be representative of the farmer population. The representative sample in 
this case must include farmers with different farmlands at different locations (upstream, middle, 
and downstream) within the scheme, which could only be obtained through stratified random 
sampling. Farmland locations were initially identified by lateral numbers (1 to 14) and later 
converted into distances in kilometers (km). The laterals are spaced at regular intervals which 
were estimated to be 0.5km each. The distance from the reservoir to the first lateral was 
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estimated to be 0.9km. In all, the laterals span over 6.5km from lateral 1 to lateral 14, but 7.4km 
from the reservoir to lateral 14.  
The nature of BIS can be seen in figure 3.2 which represents the map of BIS. The 
decision to consider farmland locations was taken because we believe that farmers at different 
farmland locations within the scheme would value the irrigation scheme differently but not based 
on the communities in which they live nor the FBOs they belong to. It would also be difficult to 
judge a farmer’s value based on the crop produced because almost all the farmers in the scheme 
produce the same crops at different seasons. And also to avoid something similar to the avidity 
bias (see Thomson, 1991), interviewing farmers at random on site would only capture farmers 
who visit their farms regularly or had more work to do on their farms during the survey period.  
  The survey was designed and pretested to ensure the questions were meaningful to the 
respondents. The survey was conducted face-to-face, either on the farm site or at the residence of 
the farmer. Even though, the face-to-face interview might influence the WTP due to interviewer 
bias (Boyd and Westfall, 1970), it is the best possible way to conduct survey in the area because 
telephone and mailing systems work poorly in the area.  To avoid the interviewer bias, the 
interviewers were given several hours of training and even practiced among themselves. This 
was done to equip them with the ability to answer any questions that might arise during the 
interview. Respondents were also asked to give the possible ways by which they could be 
contacted after the survey in order to make follow ups if necessary. There were five interviewers 
and each was supposed to interview only 20 farmers in order to avoid spending large amount of 


















3.4 Survey Creation and Pretest 
 The survey questionnaire for this study was designed to follow the CVM survey 
questionnaire design proposed by Bateman and Turner (1992), Boyle (2003), and the World 
Bank’s guidance  on survey questionnaires design to assess demand and WTP of consumers ( see 
Cointreau-Levine and Coad, 2000).   
 Both Bateman and Turner (1992) and Boyle (2003)  propose that a good CVM survey 
questionnaire should include an introductory part that will help the respondent to understand 
what the survey is about. The non-market good should be well described and how it will be 
provided. The payment vehicle should be well defined (and should be what the respondent is 
familiar with). There should be a decision rule, the provider of the non-market good should be 
stated. Auxiliary questions should be included in the questionnaire, and any other information 
including the method/format that will assist in the elicitation of the WTP. Cointreau-Levine and 
Coad, (2000) divide the sections of WTP and demand assessment questionnaire into various 
sections including identification, major concerns, existing situation regarding the program under 
study, the WTP, demand assessment, and the demographic information section. These divisions 
may just be to simply demarcate one section from the other. The survey questionnaire for this 
study adopted the first three and the last sections suggested by Cointreau-Levine and Coad, 
(2000). 
 In the introductory part of the questionnaire, the background information of the BIS 
including the proposed program clearly states what the survey is about. The survey questionnaire 
is available in Appendix I.  
The identification section is designed to give an identification number to the respondent 
and also to identify the location of his/her farmland in a form of a lateral number. The third 
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question in the identification section is to find out about the position of the respondent, either 
head of the household or spouse of the head of the household.  
The major concerns section is to find out about respondents’ perception about over-
dependence on rain-fed agriculture, we present a list of possible problems that might be faced by 
households at random basis to each respondent. Respondents are asked to select all their major 
concerns from lack of water for irrigation; lower crop yield from rain-fed agriculture; poverty, 
hunger and starvation; to severe drought. Respondents are also asked to rank their major 
concerns from most serious to second most serious.  
The third section elicits existing situation regarding the BIS. Under this section, farmers 
are asked questions regarding the use of the irrigation facilities including water. Farmers are first 
asked questions about their land holdings within and outside the scheme just to find out where 
they are likely to produce more crops from. For farmers who have more plots of land at different 
locations within the scheme, they are asked to state their sizes and locations. Farmers are also 
asked to find out how they obtained those plots, and how much they paid for them the previous 
year if the plots are leased to them. And also to be able to estimate revenues of individual 
farmers as well as the average revenue to farmers in the entire scheme, farmers are required to 
answer questions about their previous year’s crop yield and estimated cost of production. This 
information will also help in cost-benefit analysis of the scheme.  As part of the auxiliary 
questions suggested by Boyle (2003), questions like the number of seasons they cultivate crops 
within the scheme, and whether there are other limitations to farming apart from lack of facilities 
and lack of water are also part of this section. 
The WTP section clearly explains the payment vehicle as ISC per ha per year and also 
states the decision rule clearly that the program will not be implemented if the money collected is 
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not enough. The WTP elicitation format is the PC approach. The PC was redesigned after the 
pretest, to cover the likely range of responses. The maximum WTP bids on the PC were 
determined using the exponential design suggested by Rowe et al (1996), by increasing the listed 
values and the intervals between the listed values at an increasing rate. This was done to avoid 
the range and centering biases in PC approach. The range of values used is to cover the proposed 
ISC that is proposed by MiDA. Labor days contributions of the farmers are also asked in this 
section to find out how many days farmers are willing to contribute to improve the project in 
addition to the ISCs. The final section is the other information which elicits the socioeconomic 
information of the respondents. 
 After the survey questionnaire was satisfactorily designed, it was sent out for a pretest 
during the final week of June, 2012. The purpose of the pretest was to ensure that all the 
questions were understood by the farmers and to find out if questions were supposed to be added 
or deleted from the questionnaire. 15 farmers were interviewed during the pretest after which, the 
questionnaire was edited after realizing that some of the farmers have no formal education, and 
also, could only measure their farm yields in bags, baskets, and buckets instead of in kilograms. 
The response option “no formal education” was added to the questions that elicits educational 
level. The farmers were also allowed to state their farm yields in whatever units they were 
familiar with so that the units could be converted into standard units after the survey. 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
The actual survey was conducted on July 05, 2012 through July 09, 2012. The scheme 
manager was first contacted to help identify the respondents based on the location of their 
farmlands within the scheme. There were 14 laterals to be used in identifying the farm locations. 
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The 14 laterals were divided into 3 groups: the first 5 laterals were considered as upstream, 
laterals 6 to 10 were considered as middle, and above ten were considered as downstream. After 
identifying all the lists of farmers in the upstream, middle, and downstream, 40 farmers were 
randomly selected from each group making up 120 farmers with the intention to interview only 
100 farmers. 120 farmers were selected to make room for non-responses. The next step was how 
to locate the farmers because there is no proper address system in the area. Farmers’ homes can 
be identified by asking the community members. The survey period fell within the rainy season 
in the area and very few farmers were visiting their farms within the scheme. Most of the BIS 
farmers who have larger amount of lands outside the scheme stop farming in the scheme during 
the rainy season and rather depend on the rain-fed crop production to only get back to the 
scheme during the dry season. 
It was very difficult to locate respondents who were working on their farms outside the 
scheme. Farmers who were not met during the first visit were revisited at different times of the 
day in order to get them interviewed. Varying the visiting times in a day proved successful and 
100 farmers were interviewed. Even though some of the farmers who have more plots within the 
scheme were not willing to reveal that for the fear of redistribution which they said occurred 
some time ago, the response rate was still 100% because the farmers took the survey very serious 
and some of them even mentioned that the introduction was very attractive. 
After the interviews, questionnaires were checked to ensure that all questions were 
answered properly and the skip instructions were also obeyed. Follow ups were made to the 
homes of four respondents to fully complete their questionnaires. The data were coded and 




3.6 Treatment of Outliers 
There were few outliers. By standard practice, observations with more than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean are likely to be outliers.  The occurrence of few outliers could be 
because the survey was conducted face-to-face in addition to the interviewers being well trained 
to elicit the information. One respondent gave the cost of leasing less than a hectare of land as 
GHC 500 which was believed to be exaggerated. And a follow up revealed that the respondent 
stated the lease amount in the old Ghana currency (¢500 = GHC50). That lease amount was then 
adjusted to GHC 50. Labor days of three respondents were 100, 90, and 50. The rest of the labor 
days from other respondents were relatively low, from 1 to 25. The labor days values (100, 90, 
and 50) were dropped because they were considered as being too high and therefore outliers.  
Also, some respondents gave their family sizes as being above 40 but these larger family 
size values were not dropped or adjusted because a previous survey (Al-hassan, 2008) in the 
catchment area gave family size values even beyond 50. During the interview process the 
interviewers made sure that respondents understood the questions that were asked before 
providing answers. If a respondent answered a question in a way that showed that the question 
was not understood, he/she was asked the question repeatedly with explanations until the 









CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Under this chapter, the detailed results of the survey including the OLS and the MLE 
results, and the mean and the median WTP values for the improved Bontanga Irrigation Scheme 
(BIS) are presented. 
 
4.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Respondents 
 Characteristics of the respondents are presented in table 4.1. Out of the total of 100 
respondents, 6% were females and the rest were males. Fifty nine percent (59%) of the 
respondents were heads of households and the rest were in other positions including spouses of 
heads of households. The mean age of the respondents was 43.7 years. 54% of the respondents 
were between 35 and 54 years. 22% were between 25 and 34 years, and 4% were below 24 years 
with the lowest age being 19.5 years. 15% of the respondents were between 55 and 64 years, and 
5% were above 65 years with highest age of the respondents being 69.5 years. The gender and 
age distributions of the respondents show that the BIS farmers are predominantly males of the 
active working age group (19-55 years).  
The average of the highest level of education of the respondents is primary school; 73% 
of the respondents were without any formal education while 3% hold second or master’s degrees 
and above. The average household size was 16, with 2 as the lowest household size and 65 as the 
highest.  
Mean gross income of the respondents in 2010/2011 farm year was GHC 1760, about 
67% of the respondents had their gross incomes below the mean gross income with GHC 500 as 




Table 4.1  Socioeconomic Characteristics of Respondents (n=100) 
Characteristic      %       
Gender: 
Female       6    
Male       94    
Position: 
Head       59    
Other       41   
Age: 
Under 24      4   
25-34       22    
35-44       27    
45-54       27    
55-64       15    
Over 65      5    
Education: 
No formal Education     73    
Primary School      3    
Middle/JHS      9    
High School      9    
Bachelor/Tertiary     3    
Masters and above     3 
Ownership:  
Lease       6 
Other       94  
Gross Income (GHC/year): 
< GHC 1000      27    
GHC 1000 and 2000     40    
GHC 2000 and 3000     22    
GHC 3000 and 4000     6    





being GHC 5500. The mean scheme income of the respondents in 2010/2011 farm year was 
GHC 780, about 67% of the respondents earned below the mean scheme income with the lowest 
being GHC 150 while the rest earned above the mean scheme income with the highest as GHC 
2650. The mean off scheme income was GHC 980, about 65% of the respondents had off scheme 
incomes below the mean while the rest of the respondents had off scheme incomes above the 
mean. 
 The mean farmland size of the respondents in the scheme was 0.8 ha, the least being 
0.2ha and the maximum being 2.8ha. 6% of the respondents were said to be leasing their lands 
from landowners while the rest acquired their lands through families or through redistribution 
which they term as balloting. This balloting occurred few years ago after most farmlands in the 
scheme were abandoned because most farmers resorted to farming outside the scheme. The 
reason for the abandonment could be due to the fact that the scheme never witnessed any major 
maintenance for the past 30 years until 2011. The average lease price per hectare of the 
farmlands based on the lease prices provided by the 6% of the respondents was GHC 24.17. 
 
4.2 Major Concerns 
The major concerns are presented in table 4.2. Finding out about expectations of the 
respondents concerning over-dependence on rain-fed agriculture showed that 92% of the 
respondents expressed concern about lack of water for irrigation in the near future. 89% of the 
respondents expect lower crop yield from rain-fed agriculture; 64% expect poverty, hunger, and 





Table 4.2  Major Concerns (n=100) 
Major Concern    %  Most Serious (%)    2nd Most Serious (%)  
Lack of water for irrigation   92  27   53  
Lower crop yield from rain-fed agriculture 89  46   29  
Poverty, hunger, and Starvation  64  20   13  
Severe Drought    52  7   5 
 
In ranking their major concerns from most serious to second most serious, 27% of the 
respondents expressed lack of water for irrigation as being most serious while 53% expressed it 
as being second most serious. 46% of the respondents said lower crop yield from rain-fed 
agriculture is their most serious concern while 29% expressed it as their second most serious 
concern. 20% of the respondents identified poverty, hunger, and starvation as their most serious 
concern while 13% expressed it as their second most serious concern. And 7% expressed severe 
drought as their first most serious concern while 5% expressed it as their second most serious 
concern. From the analysis of the major concerns of the respondents, it is clear to judge lower 
crop yield from rain-fed agriculture as being the major concern of the farmers, followed by lack 
of water for irrigation in the near future. This information gathered from the farmers corresponds 
with the IPCC (2007) report. 
 
4.3 Existing Situation Regarding BIS 
As discussed in section 4.1, the average farmland area of the farmers within BIS was 0.8 
ha. Most of the farmers with small landholdings revealed the fact that they do not depend on 
irrigated agriculture and rather have larger farmlands outside the scheme. The mean farmland 
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size outside the scheme was reported as 2.4 ha, and about 36% of the farmers had farmland areas 
beyond the mean with the maximum being 8 ha.  
The mean value of total farmland area, both inside and outside the scheme, owned by the 
respondents was 3.2 ha. Fifty seven percent (57%) of the respondents had total farmlands areas 
below the mean, and 36% had their total farmland areas above the mean with the maximum total 
farmland area reported as 10.8 ha. This shows that the farmers are mostly peasant farmers with 
very few commercial farmers. Almost all the farmers (93%) said it would have been a problem 
depending solely on the farmlands outside the scheme. Most of the farmers said they have 
farmlands at different locations within the scheme but much information was not captured on 
that aspect because the farmers expressed fears about redistribution of the lands in the scheme 
which occurred some few years ago and were only willing to give adequate information about 
the lands for which they were selected to take part in the survey. 
 Farming in the scheme is mostly done in two seasons, wet and dry. Ideally, the scheme 
should have been able to support farmers to grow crops all year round (in three seasons). The 
crops grown were reported as maize, rice, and vegetables. The maize and rice are grown in the 
wet season while vegetables are grown in the dry season. The average rice yield in the 
2010/2011 farm year was about 21 bags
2
. Seventy six percent (76%) of the respondents said they 
were satisfied with the current allocation of water to their farms and the rest said they were not 
satisfied.  
Forty eight percent (48%) of the respondents expressed concerns about lack of regular 
maintenance of the scheme while the rest said there was no problem with lack of regular 
maintenance. Ninety seven percent (97%) of the farmers expressed concern about lack of 
facilities to support farming within the scheme. This implies BIS needs more facilities to help 
                                                          
2
 One bag of “rough rice” was estimated to be 1kg 
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attract famers to the scheme. When farmers were asked about other facilities to help improve 
BIS, among the facilities mentioned were tractors, combine harvesters, fertilizers, storage 
facilities, sprayers, and planters. Farmers expressed small plot sizes, lack of credit, pests and 
diseases, and lack of markets for their produce as other limitations to production in BIS. 
 The average years of farming under the scheme was reported as 17 years. This means that 
majority of the farmers are experienced farmers and are mostly indigenes of the catchment area 
who are not willing to move to other areas for farming. 
  
4.4 Willingness to Pay 
 In table 4.3(a) is the summary of the WTP bids, their corresponding intervals, and the 
weighted average of the WTP midpoints. The listed values on the payment card were GHC0, 
GHC10, GHC20, GHC50, GHC100, GHC150, GHC200, GHC250, GHC300, GHC350, 
GHC400, and GHC450.  The response of an individual revealed the interval within which his/her 
WTP could be located. If a respondent circled GHC10 for instance, his/her WTP is assumed to 
be between GHC10 and GHC20. Some respondents circled zero as their WTP bids. 
 There are two potential issues with responses coded in the GHC 0 and GHC 10 interval. 
First, the zero responses may be protest bids. A protest bid occurs when a respondent states zero 
value for the nonmarket resource but may have a value greater than zero for the resource. This 
behavior may be due to ethical or other reasons including rejection of some aspects of the CVM 
such as the scenario or the payment vehicle (Halstead, Luloff, and Stevens, 1992; Boyle, 2003). 
Some respondents may state zero based on the belief that the good should be provided for free. 
Protest bids result in understating mean WTP or capable of biasing the aggregate benefits 
downward.   
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Table 4.3(a)    WTP bids, their Corresponding Intervals, and the Weighted Average of the 
midpoints (n=100) 
 
WTP Bid (GHC) Interval (GHC)  %  Weighted Average 
0   0-10    31   1.55  
10   10-20    44   6.60  
20   20-50    19   6.65   
50   50-100    3   2.25    
100   100-150   2   2.50    
150   150-200   1   1.75   
200   200-250   0   0   
250   250-300   0   0    
300   300-350   0   0    
350   350-400   0   0    
400   400-450   0   0    
450   450 +    0   0    
Total       100   21.30 
 
There are no established criteria for identifying protest bids in WTP surveys because they 
appear problematic to identify in some cases (Boyle, 2003). Boyle (2003) also proposes that 
certain measures including follow up questions to obtain reasons for zero bids may be helpful, 
and that it is better to note that responses of individuals may suggest protests and their reasons 
may not. Table 4.3(b) is the summary of the number of the zero bids with reasons. Some of the 
respondents stated that management would misappropriate the money. Others said the cost of 
production under the scheme was too high, land sizes were too small, crop yield was too low,  
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Table 4.3(b) Number of Zero WTP Bids with Reasons 
Reason       Number 
Management will misappropriate the money   19 
Cost of production is too high    2 
Land sizes are too small     1 
Crop yield is too low      4 
Water is not well distributed     2 
Prevalence of crop diseases     3 
 
 
and water was not well distributed. Others too cited prevalence of crop diseases. In this case, 
misappropriation of the funds sounds like protest because the respondents seem to have value for 
the project but not sure the funds will be used as expected.  
Second, the rest of the reasons in table 4.3(b) may be from respondents who actually have 
zero value for the good. These “actual zeros”, when used in the analysis as the midpoint interval 
of GHC 0 and GHC 10 will lead to overstatement of the mean WTP or the aggregate benefits 
from the improvement.   
The presence of both sources of error (protest and actual zeros) with countervailing 
impacts means that one cannot determine systematically whether estimate is an understatement 
or overstatement of the mean WTP. The fact is that, each error does offset the other to some 
extent. For this reason, the analysis was conducted with the original dataset intact. 
In addition to the ISC, all the respondents agreed to the question whether they will be 
willing to contribute labor to improve the outcomes of the project. The average number of labor 
days the respondents were willing to contribute was 5.51 days per year. About 73% of the 
respondents were willing to contribute labor days ranging from 1 to almost the mean labor days, 
while 24% were willing to contribute labor days above the mean value up to maximum of 25 
40 
 
days per year. Some of the labor days could be overstated by the respondents simply because an 
open ended question format was used to elicit the labor days. The interesting thing in this case is 
that the labor days and the WTP bid each negatively correlates with the location of the farm. This 
suggests strongly that, farmers located downstream in the scheme are to some extent pessimistic 
about the success of the project.  
 
4.5 OLS and MLE Estimation Procedures 
 The empirical models for the OLS and the MLE estimations are already presented in 
section 2.4.2. Thirteen (13) variables were initially selected in the main OLS and MLE 
estimations. All the variables are already defined in table 4.4 and the descriptive statistics are in 
table 4.5. The OLS and the MLE estimations were done using STATA 11. In the OLS, 
lnmidptwtp was selected as the dependent variable and the other variables including the  
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents were the independent variables. The OLS was 
estimated using the model (2) in 2.4.2.  
In the MLE, lnwtpl and lnwtpu were both selected to represent the dependent variable 
because the two variables are required to make use of the interval between the logarithms of the 
lower and the upper WTP values. The same independent variables were used in the MLE. The 
MLE was estimated using model (4) in 2.4.2.  
 The MLE interval estimation is the best procedure in payment card data analysis so 
emphasis will be laid on the MLE results. Some of the variables in the main model appeared to 
be highly correlated so in choosing the variables as well as the best model, both likelihood ratio 




Table 4.4    Definition of the Selected Variables  
Variable                                                                         Definition 
 midptwtp       Midpoint of the WTP interval 
lnmidptwtp                                            Logarithm of the midpoint of WTP interval 
lnwtpl                                                     Logarithm of the lower bound of the WTP interval 
 lnwtpu                                                   Logarithm of the upper bound of WTP interval 
locationoffarm                                       Location of the farmland (distance in km from the dam) 
 landin                        Land size within the scheme in hectares 
waterallocation         Dummy variable = 1 if satisfied, 0 otherwise 
ownership                                               Dummy variable = 1 if land is leased,  0 otherwise 
leaseprice                                                Lease price of the farmland in Ghana Cedis 
sex                                                          Dummy variable = 1 for male, 0 for female 
age                                                         Age of respondent in years: 19.5 = < 24 years, 
                                                              29.5 = 25 to 34, 39.5 = 35 to 44, 49.5 = 45 to 54 
                                                              59.5 = 55 to 64, 69.5 = > 65 
labordays     Number of days a respondent is willing to work to improve  
       the scheme. 
education1                                             Level of education of respondent: 1 = no formal educ., 
                                                               2 = primary school, 3 = middle/junior high school, 
                                                               4 = high school, 5 = first degree, 
                                                               6 = second degree and above. 
familysize                                              Family size (numbers) 
lnschemeIncome                                  Logarithm of the farmer’s income from the scheme 
lnoffschemeIncome               Logarithm of the farmer’s income from outside the scheme 
lngrossincome    Logarithm of the farmer’s gross income  
perschemincome   Percentage of farmer’s income from the scheme   






Table 4.5    Descriptive Statistics (n = 100) 
Variable          Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
midptwtp  21.3  26.0789  5  175 
lnmidptwtp  2.6437  0.8613   1.6094  5.1648 
wtpl                  13.2      21.2194            0          150 
wtpu           29.4      31.2636           10         200 
lnwtpl
3
   1.6467  1.2969   0  4.6052 
lnwtpu   3.0666  0.7215   2.3026  5. 
 locationoffarm 4.04  2.2157   0.9  7.4 
landin   0.7984  0.5205   0.2  2.8 
ownership  0.06  0.2387   0  1 
leaseprice  1.45  6.5926   0  50 
sex   0.94  0.2387   0  1 
age   43.7  12.4056  19.5  69.5 
education1  1.75  1.3735   1  6 
familysize  16.36  12.4061  2  65 
labordays  5.51  5.3837   1  25 
grossIncome          1760     1177.397          500             5500 
schemeincome   780      588.6983          150        2650 
 lnschemeincome 6.331207     0.8856    5.0106   7.8823 
offschemeincome  980      588.6983          350        2850 
lnoffschemeincome 7.2433     0.7115     6.2146    8.6125 
 Yield    21.135  22.2897  0  125 
                                                          
3
 Wtpl = 0 is not transformed but used as lnwtpl = 0 in the MLE interval analysis.  
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were placed on the main model. The main model is in table 4.6(a). The model in table 4.6(b) 
appeared to be the best model. The wald test was used to determine the joint significance of the 
highly correlated variables. The wald test results showed that, the leaseprice and ownership 
variables jointly in the main model creates statistical significant improvement but 
lnoffschemeincome and lnschemeincome jointly in the main model does not. The wald test also 
helped in the selection of the model in table 4.6 (b) as the best model to explain the findings in 
this thesis.  The other WTP regressions and the test results are found in appendix II and III, 
respectively. The model in table 4.6(b) which is used for further analysis in this thesis gave a 
likelihood ratio chi square value of 26.01 which is significant at 1% level. The model is 
statistically significant meaning the independent variables jointly have effects on the dependent 
variable. This suggests that the model is good. The OLS was only used for first approximations 
but was not considered for further analysis because it is not suitable for PC data analysis 
(Cameron and Huppert, 1989). Each of perschemincome and lngrossincome variable was also 
used in the main model to substitute for the scheme and off scheme income variables and the 
results can be found in appendix II. 
It was also realized that all the respondents agreed they would be willing to provide labor 
in a form of labor days to improve the scheme. This means all the respondents gave labor days 
greater than zero.To explore any relationship between the labordays variable and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, tobit regression model was used with the  
labordays as a dependent variable in the same ways the other dependent variables were used. 
Tobit model was used because the labor days were censored at 1 day.  Only the results of the 
tobit regression in which gross income was used are presented in table 4.6(c). The rest of the 
labor days’ regression results are also in appendix II. 
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Table 4.6(a) Main OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     7.0231     9.5363** 
     (1.35)     (2.25) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1172***    -0.0752** 
     (-2.95)     (-2.44) 
Ownership    1.9753***    1.8237*** 
     (2.72)     (2.69) 
Leaseprice    -0.0542**    -0.0663** 
     (-2.07)     (-2.22) 
Sex     -0.0860    -0.1558 
     (-0.21)     (-0.49) 
Age     0.0073     0.0026 
     (0.94)     (0.41) 
education1    0.0274     0.0515 
     (0.42)     (1.04) 
Familysize    -0.0044    -0.0022 
     (-0.49)     (-0.30) 
Landin     0.2032     0.2342 
     (1.00)     (1.51) 
Waterallocation    0.1800     0.1177 
     (0.89 )       (0.75)     
Lnoffschemeincome   -1.9915    -3.2458* 
     (-0.87)     (-1.76) 
Lnschemeincome   1.5586     2.5995* 
     (0.86)     (1.79) 
Yield     0.0047     0.0037 
     (0.91)     (0.93)    
σ     0.7950     0.5407  
          (9.8413) 
Log likelihood        -98.4487 
LR chi2(12)         29.08***  
  
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.68    GHC 14.08 
 
Average  
mean WTP.    GHC 21. 51    GHC 16.30 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table 4.6(b) OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
lnoffschemeincome = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     2.5647***     2.2207*** 
     (2.77)     (3.02) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1178***    -0.0781*** 
     (-2.97)     (-2.48) 
Ownership    1.9654***    1.8389*** 
     (2.71)     (2.75) 
Leaseprice    -0.0569**    -0.0715*** 
     (-2.19)     (-2.56) 
Sex     -0.0271    -0.0582 
     (-0.07)     (-0.18) 
Age     0.0071     0.0024 
     (0.91)     (0.38) 
education1    0.0206     0.0415 
     (0.32)     (0.83) 
Familysize    -0.0074    -0.0074 
     (-0.91)     (-1.09) 
Landin     0.1903     0.2167 
     (0.94)     (1.38) 
Waterallocation    0.2068     0.1619 
     (1.04 )       (1.02)     
Lnschemeincome   -0.0114    0.0487 
     (-0.11)     (0.54) 
Yield     0.0040     0.0025 
     (0.79)     (0.62)    
σ     0.7939     0.5540  
          (9.7784) 
Log likelihood        -99.9817 
LR chi2(12)         26.01***  
  
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.58    GHC 14.00 
 
Average  
mean WTP.    GHC 21. 35    GHC 16.32 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table 4.6(c) OLS and Tobit Estimates of Labor Days when Gross Income is used 
Variable    OLS     Tobit    
Constant    18.9166**    17.4781** 
    (2.38)     (2.21)     
Locationoffarm  -0. 3026    -0.3217   
    (-1.12)     (-1.21)     
Ownership   5.3705     9.8425     
    (0.94)     (1.26)     
Leaseprice   -0. 2420    -0.4947   
    (-1.27)     (-1.49)     
Sex    0.4378     0.9044     
    (0.16)     (0.33)     
Age    -0.0160    -0.1672    
    (-0.30)     (-0.32)     
education1   0.4211     0.3812    
    (0.89)     (0.81)     
Familysize   0.0901     0.1029*    
    (1.63)     (1.86)     
Landin    -0.0919     -0.1454    
    (-0.07)     (-0.11)     
Waterallocation   1.6797     1.2859    
    (1.26 )       (0.97)        
Lngrossincome  -2.1931**    -2.0347**   
    (-2.35)     (-2.21)     
Yield    0.0325     0.0336     
    (0.95)     (1.00) 
Log likelihood       -284.6423 
LR chi2(11)        14.92    
  
Average  
median labordays  5.59     5.28    
 
Average  
mean labordays  5.51     5.26  
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 








4.6 Calculation of the Median and the Mean WTP 
 Following Cameron and Huppert (1989), the fitted values were constructed for the 
logarithm of the dependent variables (lnmidptwtp in OLS, and both lnwtpl and lnwtpu in 
MLE) after the regressions. For simplicity, say the fitted values of  logY. For x vector variables, 
the conditional mean of logY can be expressed in the form   
 β, and to retransform logY into Y 
(lnmidptwtp into midptwtp; lnwtpl and lnwtpu into wtpl and wtpu in our case),  exp(  
 β) is 
used which is the median WTP value. To compute the mean of Y, the median is scaled by 
exp(σ
2
/2). Where σ is the standard error of the OLS or MLE regressions. 
 
4.7 Discussion of the MLE WTP Results  
 The best MLE interval estimates are in table 4.6(b). The locationoffarm variable was 
selected to enable a test for how the locations of the farmlands along the stream affect WTP of 
farmers. This variable is significant at 1% level and proved to be negatively related to WTP.  
The sign on the coefficient of the locationoffarm makes sense because irrigation farmers 
who own lands downstream at BIS abandon their lands due to many problems including siltation. 
One would have expected the downstream farmers to be willing to pay more for the 
improvement of the project, but the assumption is that they have lost hope in the project due to 
the long standing maintenance issues coupled with smaller land holdings which most of the 
farmers complained about.  
The ownership variable was selected to find out if landowners and those on lease would 
have different WTP. Ownership is significant at 1% level and has a positive coefficient which 
suggests that the willingness of landowners to pay for the improvement of the scheme is low as 
compared to those on lease. This makes sense because section 3.4.2 of the MiDA Organization 
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and Management Report which is about land committee under the scheme states that, there are 
land issues under the scheme and land owners who do not pay their ISCs will lose their lands in 
various ways, including the reallocation of the land to a family or community member (MiDA, 
2011). This MiDA report reveals lack of well defined property rights with regard to land under 
the scheme. This might be the cause of land owners’ unwillingness to invest in the project. The 
willingness of lessees to pay for the improvement may be because the lessees may not be 
indigenous of the catchment area and are likely at BIS for commercial farming. In this case, the 
lessees may be leasing the lands from GIDA and may be willing to pay more to improve the 
scheme so that they can increase their returns from the fixed land inputs. 
 Leaseprice  variable is significant at 1% level and has a negative sign on its coefficient. 
This conforms to economic theory because willingness to pay for the improvement of the 
irrigation scheme is expected to decrease as the lease price of the farmland increases. Increase in 
land lease price has the tendency to affect the farmer’s revenue from the scheme which will then 
negatively impact the farmers’ WTP.  
The rest of the selected variables: lnschemeincome, sex, age, education1, Familysize, 
Landin, Waterallocation, and Yield are, however, not statistically significant but have the 
expected signs on their coefficients. The sign on the coefficient of lnschemeincome is positive 
which makes sense because WTP is expected to increase as the farmer’s income from the 
scheme increases. This conforms to economic theory. The sign of the coefficient of the sex 
variable is negative which makes sense because women in Ghana do not mostly participate in 
irrigated agriculture, but where they do, they mostly grow vegetables in order to sell and also to 
supplement the family needs. This is what happens at BIS and the women who are housewives 
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are willing to pay more to sustain the scheme so that they can produce more vegetables from 
which they can earn income as well as serve their housewife duties.  
The age variable has a positive sign on its coefficient which also makes sense because 
most of the farmers are within the active working age (19-55) and the proportion of farmers 
within the scheme increases as the age increases up to about 55 years before the proportion turns 
to decrease. The decrease in proportion of aged farmers does not suggest their unwillingness to 
participate in the irrigation project but due to the fact that aged farmers hand over their lands to 
their family members who are within the active working age group. In this case age can be 
judged as a proxy for experience and the experienced farmers can be willing to pay more to 
improve the project if they perceive it to be helpful to them.  
One would have expected the education1 variable to have a negative sign on its 
coefficient because farmers with higher education in the area probably have higher off farm 
incomes. But this is not the case under BIS and one would attribute the willingness of the more 
educated farmers to pay more to improve the scheme to the fact that, the educated farmers may 
very well understand the need to sustain the project and also, they may be the kind of farmers 
from outside the catchment area who travel to the area to do commercial farming. Such 
commercial farmers certainly want to pay more to improve the project so that they can maximize 
their profits. The Familysize variable has negative sign on its coefficient which suggests that, 
larger families are not will to pay more to improve the project. This may be due to the fact that 
larger families depend mostly on outside the scheme lands to feed their families. The Landin 
variable also has a positive sign on it coefficient which also makes sense. Farmers with more 
land within the scheme depend on the scheme for most of their earnings and are willing to pay 
more to improve the project. 
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Also, both the waterallocation and Yield variables have positive signs on their 
coefficients which are meaningful. The upstream farmers within the scheme are mostly those 
without water allocation issues. These farmers are optimistic about how much they can gain from 
improving the scheme and are therefore willing to pay more to improve the scheme. Also, once 
the farmer’s crop yield within the scheme increases, the assumption is that his/her income will 
increase and the farmer would be willing to pay more to improve the scheme. 
The MLE estimates when each of the perschemeincome and lngrossincome variables 
were used are in appendix II. The signs on the coefficients of the variables remained the same 
and the perschemeincome and lngrossincome variables still have the expected signs which are 
positive but still not statistically significant. The positive sign on the coefficient of the 
perschemeincome indicates that, as the percentage of the famer’s income that is from the 
scheme increases, the farmer would be willing to pay more for the improvement of the project. 
This makes sense and conforms to demand theory.That of the positive sign on the coefficient of 
the lngrossincome also makes sense because the scheme income forms part of the gross income 
even though the off scheme income is higher for each farmer than the scheme income, both 
incomes are positively correlated which means they grow together. Likelihood ratio chi square 
test for each regression was significant at 1% which suggests the models are good. 
 
4.8 Discussion of the Labor Days’ Tobit Results 
 All the variables in the labordays regression when the gross income was used maintained 
the signs of their coefficients as in the main WTP MLE results except the sex, age, familysize, 
and landin variables. The sign on the sex variable switched to positive which might be due to 
the common perception in the catchment areas that men are supposed to provide farm labor. So 
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in this case men are willing to work more days to improve the project as compared to women. 
The negative sign on the age variable tells us that the farmers in their younger ages are willing to 
work more days than the elderly farmers. The landin variable has a negative sign on its 
coefficient and this can be ascribed to the thinking that larger land holders are probably 
commercial farmers who prefer to pay in a form of money than in labor days.  
The two most important variables in the labor days’ regression are familysize and 
lngrossincome. The familysize variable is significant at 10% level while the lngrossincome 
variable is significant at 5% level. The sign on the coefficient of the familysize variable is 
positive which suggests that larger families are willing to pay in a form of labor than in a form of 
money. This makes sense because they may feel that they have more labor force to contribute 
than money in order to improve the project. And for the lngrossincome variable, the sign is 
negative which simply means that, farmers are willing to donate less labor to improve the project 
as their incomes increases. This could be due to the higher opportunity cost of their time. The 
results could also be from the fact that the marginal utility of income for the low income 
households is higher as compared to that of the higher income households. Therefore, lower 










CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The main aim of this thesis was to determine how much farmers under the Bontanga 
Irrigation Scheme would be willing to pay for the improvement of the project. From the results, 
the median WTP was calculated as GHC14.00 (US$7.29) per ha per year and the mean WTP was 
calculated as GHC 16.32 (US$8.50) per ha per year. The median WTP value represents the 
amount 50% of the farmers will be willing to pay and at the same time it represents the amount 
50% of the farmers will not be willing to pay. The mean represents the average amount an 
individual farmer will be willing to pay for the improvement of the project. The significant and 
most influencing factors that were identified to affect WTP of farmers are location of the farm, 
ownership, and land lease prices. Farmers upstream had higher willingness to pay for the 
improvement as compared to farmers downstream and in the middle. WTP decreases as the 
distance from the reservoir increases. Land owners have lower willingness to pay for the 
improvement as compared to lessees. This appears contrary to what one would expect but there 
appear to be land ownership issues under the scheme which are clearly stated under section 3.4.2 
in the MiDA Organization and Management Report, 2011.  The MiDA report states that, land 
owners who do not pay their ISCs may lose their lands to either family or community members.  
 Most of the CVM studies in developing countries are centered on WTP for irrigation 
water or drinking water under improved water supply conditions. So their results are not directly 
comparable to this study.  There are also no similar studies on irrigation schemes in Ghana that 
are published for one to compare the results of this study to. Results from this study may only be 
comparable to those which are discussed in chapter two in terms of WTP values, simply because 
each study is carried out under different set up and CVM scenario. It sounds like WTP for 
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irrigation services in developing countries are low, comparing our results to those of 
Weldasilassie et al (2009), Chandrasekaran et al (2009), Akter (2007), and Basarir et al (2009) 
which are discussed in chapter 2. 
 This study is only to provide a useful insight to the limited research in WTP for irrigation 
improvement in Ghana. So based on the results from this study, BIS could consider benefit cost 
analysis of the project to see if the total benefits from the improvement of the project would 
outweigh the total costs before charging farmers the new ISC. If the new ISC is implemented, it 
would serve as the first step to achieving the proposed GHC 246.42 (US$128.34) per ha per year 
as the ISC required under the PPP management framework. 
 The aggregate benefits per year for the improvement of BIS assuming each farmer is 
expected to pay the mean WTP amount can be calculated as GHC 9,302.40 (US$ 4,845.00) 
which is obtained by multiplying the mean WTP  (GHC 16.32 (US$ 8.50)) by the current 
irrigated land area (570 ha). This aggregate benefits value does not reflect the additional benefits 
to the scheme when the irrigated land is expanded.  
Another way BIS could improve the project is to utilize the supply of labor which is 
agreed upon by all the farmers. The average labor days of the respondents based on the tobit 
regression was calculated as 5.26 days/year and the median is 5.28 days/year. Comparing the 
average labor days to the mean WTP, GHC 3.10 (US$1.62) can be considered as the monetary 
value of a labor day under the scheme.  
   
Limitations to the Study 
 Even though the response rate was 100% and respondents were willing to participate in 
the interviews, it was still difficult to obtain accurate measures of the respondents’ farm outputs. 
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Based on that, farm outputs which were expressed in bags had to be converted into kilograms 
(rice especially) but those which were expressed in baskets (vegetables in particular) could not 
be converted into standard units. This conversion could be imprecise because a bag of “rough 
rice” under the scheme was estimated as 1kg.  Also, because majority of the farmers in the 
scheme lack formal education, they rarely keep individual farm records which made it difficult 
for us to retrieve their farm data. So farmers under the scheme should be advised to start keeping 
records of their farming activities including their farm outputs in standard units which will make 
it easier for researchers to study the scheme.  
 Also, most of the farmers practice mixed cropping at all seasons and this makes itdifficult 
to estimate their crop water requirements which could have been used in our analysis. One next 
study could sort the farmers according to the crops they grow in order to include the crop water 
requirements which may also be an important factor in determining farmers’ WTP. 
Another factor that might affect WTP of farmers in the catchment area is their political 
inclinations. It would not be surprising for farmers in developing countries to underestimate or 
overestimate their WTP bids based on their political party affiliations. One next study on the 
scheme should try to implicitly or explicitly elicit information about the political party 
affiliations of the farmers to find out the differences in WTP bids that might result from their 
political values. 
Lastly, land ownership under the scheme seems not to be well defined because some 
farmers were not willing to disclose their total land sizes because of the fear of redistribution, 
which they said occurred some years ago. In this case, it is hard to get accurate farm data which 




Opportunities for Further Studies  
1. The next step recommended is to conduct cost benefit analysis of the scheme to see if 
increasing the irrigation service charges based on this study would be beneficial. 
2. Since location appears to be very important (significant) in all the WTP regressions, 
the next study under the scheme could try to control for location by estimating WTP 
for different locations (upstream, middle, and downstream) to see if WTP values for 
the locations will differ considerably. 
 
3. If location really matters, regrouping the FBOs based on the location of their farms 
sounds like a good idea as compared to the current FBO formation which is based on 
communities. If the regrouping is done, the scheme may decide to charge the entire 
individual ISCs to the FBO and since WTP based on this research is location specific, 
the scheme may try to study the variations that are likely to occur in the payment of 
the ISCs and then decide what further actions to take.  
 
4. If funding is available, researchers might consider estimating WTP for the two 
different seasons (wet and dry). This is because the level of utilization of the project 
















Akter, S. 2007. “Farmers’ Willingness to Pay for Irrigation Water Under Government Managed 
Small Scale Irrigation Projects in Bangladesh.” Journal of Bangladesh Studies. 9:21-31 
 
Alberini, A., B. Boyle, and M. Welsh. 1999. “Analysis of Contingent Valuation Data with 
Multiple Bids and Response Options Allowing Respondents to Express Uncertainty.” Department 
of Economic. 99-18, University of Colorado, Boulder. 
 
Al-hassan, S. 2008. “Technical Efficiency of Rice Farmers in Northern Ghana.” African 
Economic Research Consortium Paper 178, Department of Economics and Entrepreneurship 
Development, University for Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana. 
 
Arrow, K., R. Sollow, P. R. Portney, E. E. Leamer, R. Radner, and H. Schuman. 1993. Report of 
the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation. 
 
Basarir, A., M. Sayili, and S. Muhammed. 2009. “Analyzing Producers’ Willingness to Pay for 
High Quality Irrigation Water.” Bulgarian Journal of Agricultural Science. 15(6):566-573. 
 
Bateman, I. J., and R. K. Turner. 1992. “Evaluation of the Environment: The Contingent 
Valuation Method.” CSERGE Working Paper GEC 92-18. 
 
Boyd, H. W., and R. Westfall. 1970. “Interviewer Bias Once More Revisited.” Journal of 
Marketing Research. 7(2):249-253. 
 
Boyle, K.J., F. R. Johnson, D. W. McCollum, W. H. Desvousges, R.W. Dunford, and S. P. 
Hudson. 1996. “Valuing Public Goods: Discrete Versus Continuous Contingent-Valuation  
Responses.” Land Economics. 72(3): 381-396. 
 
Bolyle, K. J. 2003. “Contingent Valuation in Practice.” In  Champ, P. A., K. J. Boyle, and T. C. 
Brown, eds. A Primer on Nonmarket Valuation. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, pp 111-158. 
 
 
Cameron, T.A., and D. D. Huppert. 1987. “Non-market Resource Valuation: Assessment of 
Value Elicitation by ‘Payment-Card’ Versus ‘Referendum’ Methods.” Discussion Paper #448, 
Department of Economics, Unniversity of California, Los Angeles, CA. 
 
Cameron, T.A., and D. D. Huppert. 1989. “OLS versus ML Estimation of Non-market Resource 
values with Payment Card Interval Data.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management. 17: 230-246. 
 
Carson, R. T., W. M. Hanemann. 2005. Contingent Valuation, Handbook of Environmental 




Casey, J. F., J. R. Kahn, and A. Rivas. 2005. “Willingness to Pay for Improved Water Services in 
Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil.” Ecological Economics.  
 
Chandrasekaran, K.,  S. Devarajulu, P. Kuppannan. 2009. “Farmers’ Willingness to Pay for 
Irrigation Water: A Case of Tank Irrigation Systems in South India.” Water. 1(1):5-18. 
 
Cointreau-Levine, S., and A. Coad. 2000. “Private Sector Participation in Municipal Solid Waste 
Management, Guidance Pack.” St. Gallen, Swizerland. 
 
FAO. 2000. Economics and Social Development Paper. 2000. Rome. 
 
Faux, J., and G. M. Perry. 1999. “Estimating Irrigation Water Value Using Hedonic Price 
Analysis: A case Study in Malheur County, Oregon. Land Economics. 75(3):440-452. 
 
Flores, N. E. 2003. “Conceptual Framework for Nonmarket Valuation.” In  Champ, P. A., K. J. 
Boyle, and T. C. Brown, eds. A Primer on Nonmarket Valuation. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 27-58. 
 
Ghana, Republic of, MOFA. 2007. http://mofa.gov.gh 
 
Ghana, Republic of, MiDA. 2011. Organization and Management Report. Bontanga and Golinga 
Irrigation Schemes – Lot 1. Revised by GIDA. 
 
Ghana, Republic of, Statistical Service. 2011. Revised Gross Domestic Product 2010. 
 
Hackle, F., and G. J. Pruckner. 1999. “On the gap between Payment Card and Closed-ended 
CVM answers.” Applied Economics. 31:733-742. 
 
Halstead, J. M., A.E. Luloff, and T. H. Stevens. 1992. “Protest Bidders in Contingent Valuation.” 
Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 21(2): 160-169 
 
Kramer, R. A., and J. I. Eisen-Hecht. 2002. “Estimating the Economic Value of Water Quality 
Protection in the Catawba River Basin.” Water Resources Research. 38(9), 1182 
 
Kyei-Baffour, N., and  E. Ofori. 2006. “Irrigation Development and Management in Ghana:  
Prospects and Challenges”. Journal of Science and Technology 26 (2):148-159. 
 
Loomis, J.1990 “Comparative Reliability of the Dichotomous Choice and Open-Ended 
Contingent Valuation Techniques.” Journal of Economics and Management. 18:78-85 
 
McTernan, J. A. 2011. “The Economic Value of White Water Sports in the Cache La Poudre 
Canyon, Colorado.” Thesis submitted to the Dapartment of Agricultural and Resource 




Medellin-Azuara, J., J. J. Harou, and R. E. Howitt. 2010. “Estimating Economic Value of 
Agricultural Water under Changing Conditions and the Effects of Spatial Aggregation.” Science 
of the Total Environment. 408: 5639-5648. 
 
Mitchell, R.C., R.T. Carson. 1981. “An Experiment in Determining Willingness to Pay for 
National Water Quality Improvements”. Report to the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
 
Mitchell, R.C., R. T. Carson. 1986. “The Use of Contingent Valuation Data for Benefit–Cost 
Analysis in Water Pollution Control”. Final Report to the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
 
Miyoshi, T., and N. Nagayo. 2006. “A study of the Effectiveness and Problems of JICA’s 
Technical Cooperation from a Capacity Development Perspective: Case Study of Support for the 
Advancement of Ghana’s Irrigated Agriculture.” Case Study Report on Capacity Development. 
Japan Institute for International Cooperation and Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Namara, E.R., L. Horowitz, B. Nyamadi, and  B. Barry. 2011. “Irrigation Development in 
Ghana: Past Experiences, Emerging Opportunities, and Future Directions.” GSSP Working 
Paper #27, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C. 
 
Portney, P. R. 1994. “The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care.” Journal 
of Economic Perspective. 8(4):3-17. 
 
Qureshi, M. E., R. Ranjan, and S. E. Qureshi. 2010. “AN Empirical Assessment of the value of 
Irrigation Water: The Case Study od Murrumbridge Catchment.” The Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics. 54: 99-188 
 
Ready, R. C., J. C. Buzby, and D. Hu. 1996. “Differences between Continuous and Discrete 
Contingent Value Estimate.” Land Economics. 72 (3):397-411. 
 
Ring, K. L. 1998. “An Analysis of Adoption and Management of Irrigation Systems in 
Colorado.” Thesis submitted to the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
Colorado State University, Fort Collins. 
 
 
Rowe, R.D., W. D. Schulze, and W. S. Breffle. 1996. “A Test for Payment Card Biases”. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management. 31:178–185. 
 
STATA Annotated Output Interval Regression. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, 
Statistical Consulting Group.  From http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/Stata_interval.htm 





Storm, H., T. Heckelei, C. Heidecke. 2010. “Demand Estimation for Irrigation Water in the 
Moroccan Drâa Valley using Contingent Valuation.” Discussion Paper, Institute for Food and 
Resource Economics, University of Bonn, Germany. 
 
Thomson, C.J. 1991. “Effects of the Avidity Bias on Survey Estimates of Fishing Effort and 
Economic Value.” American Fisheries Society Symposium. 12:356-366. 
 
Weldesilassie, A. B., O. Fror, E. Boelee, and S. Dabbert. 2009. “The Economic Value of 
Improved Wastewater Irrigastion: A Contingent Valuation Study in Addiss Ababa, Ethiopia.” 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 34(3):428-449. 
 
Whittington, D. 1998. “Administering Contingent valuation Surveys in Developing Countries.” 
World Development. 26(1):21-30. 
 
Whittington, D., J. Briscoe, X. Mu, and W. Barron. 1990. “Estimating the Willingness to Pay for   
Water Services in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Use of Contingent Valuation 
Surveys in Southern Haiti.”  Economic Development and Cultural Change. 38(2):293-311. 
 
World Bank. 1995. “Ghana: Poverty Past, Present and Future.” Population and Human 
Resources Division, West Central Africa Department, Africa Region. Report No. 14504-GH. 
Washington D.C.  29 July. 
 
World Bank. 2002. “Contingent Valuation,” Environmental Economics and Development Policy 
Course. Washington D.C.  15-26 July. 
 
 
Young, R.A. 2005. “Nonmarket Economic Valuation for Irrigation Water Policy Decisions: 
Some Methodological Issues.” Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education.131: 21-
25. 
 





































APPENDIX I: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Estimating Farmers’ Willingness to pay for Improved Irrigation: An Economic Study of 
the Bontanga Irrigation Scheme in Northern Ghana. 
 
Date of interview: …………………………………………………. 
Name of interviewer ……………………………………………….. 
 
Background Information 
I would like to ask you some questions that would assist you, other farmers and the 
government in determining how to improve the Bontanga Irrigation System.  These questions 
usually take about 30 minutes. We are interviewing a sample of about 100 farmers of the 
Bontanga Irrigation Scheme, so your input is considered very valuable to this survey. The 
information you give will be treated as confidential. 
As you are already aware, the Bontanga Irrigation System was rehabilitated by the 
Millennium Development Authority (MiDA)  in 2011 at the cost of  about  GHC 5 million (US$ 
3 million).  
MiDA resurfaced the main and the lateral roads on the existing 570 hectares of developed 
land, dredged the drainage system, renovated 6 farm buildings, provided 33 new threshing floors, 
and 9 maintenance sheds. And still to increase the developed land area from the current 570 
hectares to 800 hectares. 
 To ensure all year round farming in the irrigation district: 
1. The Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA) is considering the improvement 
of the irrigation technology: supporting the gravity irrigation with pumps, fixing and  replacing 
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the current gates with well designed gates for proper control of turnouts at laterals, and adding 
standard weirs at every turn for proper measuring of flows,  and  
2. Provision of more irrigation facilities including machinery (tractors, combine 
harvesters, dredging machines and so on).  
PROPOSED PROGRAM: For these to happen, the management of the Bontanga 
Irrigation Scheme which you already know is made up of you, other farmers and the 
government, will have to share the operating and maintenance costs of the irrigation project. The 
current Joint Irrigation System Management (JISM) will be replaced by Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) system.  Under PPP, the Farmer Based Organizations and the government will 
still manage the scheme but you will need a large private anchor farmer to use the newly 
developed land. This anchor farmer will help provide farm machinery and equipment for 
operation and maintenance of the scheme, buying and marketing produce from the scheme and 
providing links to existing markets and other valuable services, such as input supply. 
Let me first ask you a few identification questions. 
 
Section A. Identification: 
1. Identification #: ……………………………………………….. 
2. At which lateral is your farm located? (terminate if  different  from farm location for which the 
respondent is selected) ………………………………… 
 
3.  Position of Respondent: 




Section B. Major Concerns: 
(For this question, present the list in a different order on a random basis to each respondent) 
“I would like to show you a list of possible problems that might be faced by your farm household 
in future” 
(Select all that are major concerns to your farm household) 
a. Lack of water for irrigation    b. Lower crop yield from rain-fed agriculture    c.  
Poverty, hunger, and starvation         d. Severe drought     e. none of the above (skip to 
section c) 
 
1. Of these possible problems, which do you consider the most serious problem for your farm 
household? (choose one) 
Most serious problem …………. (Write letter – a to d) 
Don't know 
2.  And which do you consider the second most serious problem? 





Section C. Existing Situation Regarding the Bontanga Irrigation Project: 
“Now, I would like to ask you some questions regarding the use of the irrigation facilities 




1.Please give us the estimates of your farm land areas within and outside the irrigation scheme. 
Land inside the scheme (acres) Land outside the scheme (acres) Total (acres) 
   
 
2. How serious would it be if you were to depend solely on the farm lands outside the scheme? 
a. Very serious    b. Somewhat serious    c. Not serious    d. I don’t know 
 
3. Do you have farm lands at different locations within the scheme? 
a. Yes    b. No 
 







purchased, family, other 
(please specify)) 
If LEASED, how 
much did you pay last 
year? 
    
    
    
 
 
5. How many seasons do you grow your crops under the Bontanga Irrigation Scheme? 
a. One season    b. Two Seasons    c. Other, please specify…………………………. 
 






   
6. Type of crop 
7. Area 
Cultivated 
(acres) 8.Yield (Kg) 9. Cost (GHC) 
        
        
        
        
        
 
Dry Season: 
10. Type of crop 
11. Area 
Cultivated 
(acres) 12.Yield (Kg) 13. Cost (GHC) 
        
        
        
        
        
 
14. Are you satisfied with the current allocation of water to your farm household? 
a. Yes    b. No    c. I don’t know 
15. In your opinion, is there a problem of lack of regular maintenance of the irrigation project? 
a. Yes     b. No (skip 16)    c. Don’t know (skip 16) 
 
16. If you answered yes in 15 above, how do you judge the lack of regular maintenance of the 
irrigation project? 




17. In your opinion, is there a problem of lack of facilities to support farming under the irrigation 
project? (Show to respondent the list of facilities) 
a. Yes    b. No (skip18 and 19)    c. I don’t know (skip18 and 19) 
18.If you answered yes in 17 above, how do you judge the lack of facilities to support farming 
under the irrigation project? 
a. Very serious    b. Somewhat serious     c. Not serious     d. Don't know  
 
19. Are there any other facilities you think would help improve the project? (List them below) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
20. Now I want to ask you about an irrigation system that gives you water in different amounts to 
produce crops in only one season in a year and another irrigation system with all facilities that 
gives you constant amount of water to produce crops all year round (circle only one). 
a. I want to produce in one season    b. I want to produce all year round    c. I don’t know 
 
21. Are there other limitations to production besides water? List them below (Examples include 
Lack of credit, lack of storage facilities, Prevalence of pest and so on) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
22. Are you a member of a Farmer Based Organization? 
              a. Yes    b. No    c. I don’t know 




IMPROVED BONTANGA IRRIGATION PROJECT 
“As mentioned, the Bontanga Irrigation Project has just been rehabilitated and the 
management including you (I mean including the Farmer Based Organizations of which you 
are likely to be a member) still require more money to improve the system, in order to: 
1. Support gravity flow with pump,  
2. Fix and replace the current gates with well designed gates for proper control of 
turnouts at laterals,  
3. Install standard weirs at every turn for proper measuring of flows, 
4.  Provide more irrigation facilities including machinery (tractors, combine harvesters, 
dredging machines and so on), and  
5. Implement regular maintenance of the irrigation project.  
If the system is improved, you will have the opportunity to farm all year round (at least 
3 seasons) and be able to pay a flat Irrigation Service Charge (ISC) per hectare per 
year.” 
 
Section D. Willingness to Pay 
“Now, I would like to ask you questions to help us understand how much you value the irrigation 
facilities including the water you use currently and in the future. You are not required to pay 
anything as we go through the questions but we want you to answer the questions as if you 
would have to pay. It will be helpful for us to know what you think about the irrigation project 
now and in the future. 
 We already mentioned that the PPP system will be made up of you, all other farmers, the 
government, and the large anchor private farmer. The anchor private farmer will provide the 
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scheme with machinery and equipment for operation and maintenance of the scheme, buying and 
marketing produce from the scheme and providing links to existing markets. If the money 
collected is not enough, the new program will NOT be implemented”: 
 
1. What is the highest Irrigation Service Charge per hectare per year your household would pay 
for the improved irrigation program? (Answer just for the farm land for which you are selected to 
take part in this survey) 
Please circle ONLY ONE as the highest amount per hectare per year you would pay for the 
improved program 





       
            50 GHC 
 
100 GHC  
 
150 GHC 
       





       





       
             
(For response greater than zero, skip question 2) 
 
 








3.In your opinion, what do you think about increasing the irrigation charges above the current 
GHC 50 per ha per year (25 per ha per season)  to improve the irrigation project? 
a. reasonable    b. Unreasonable    c. I don’t know 
 
4. In addition to paying your ISCs would you be willing to contribute labor to improve the 
outcomes of the project? 
a. Yes    b. No (skip to section E) 
 
5. If you answered yes to 4 above, how many days per year would you be willing to work to 
improve the project? ……………….days 
 
Section E. Other Information 
“We will soon be ending this interview. Before we do end it, I would like to ask some questions 
about you and your family.” 
1.Are you 
               a. Male      b. female 
2.  What is your age? 
a. Under 24     b.  25 to 34     c.  35 to 44     d.  45 to 54    e. 55 to 64     f. Over 65  
3. What is your highest level of education? 
a. No formal education      b. Primary school    c. Middle school/ Junior high school    d. 
High school     




4. What is the highest level of education of the most educated member of your household? 
a. No formal education      b. Primary school    c. Middle school/ Junior high school    d. 
High school     
e.  First degree/Tertiary/Post-secondary    f. Second degree and above   
 
5. How many people (children and adults) live in your household? ………………. 
 
6. How many people in your household contribute to the household income? 
………………………… 
 
7.How much was your  last year’s total household income from all sources? 
a. less than GHC 1000    b. between GHC 1000 and 2000    c. between  GHC 2000 and 3000     
d. between GHC 3000 and 4000    e. Between GHC 4000 and 5000    f. More than GHC 5000 
 
8. How much of your last year’s total household income do you think came from farming under 
the scheme? 
GHC ………………………………………… 
“Thank you for your contribution to this survey. We hope to use these results to determine how 
best to provide affordable and desirable irrigation services to the farmers under the Bontanga 






APPENDIX II: WTP AND LABOR DAYS’ REGRESSIONS 
 
Table II.1 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates when the 
Percentage of Scheme Income is used.  
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     2.3835     1.1276 
     (1.16)     (0.67) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1172***    -0.0764** 
     (-2.96)     (-2.43) 
Ownership    1.9756***    1.8496*** 
     (2.73)     (2.78) 
Leaseprice    -0.0570**    -0.0712** 
     (-2.20)     (-0.57) 
Sex     -0.0254    -0.0648 
     (-0.06)     (-0.20) 
Age     0.0071     0.0023 
     (0.91)     (0.35) 
education1    0.0219     0.0442 
     (0.34)     (0.88) 
Familysize    -0.0078    -0.0075 
     (-0.98)     (-1.12) 
Landin     0.1854     0.2121 
     (0.92)     (1.36) 
Waterallocation    0.2085     0.1601 
     (1.05 )       (1.01)     
Perschemeincome   0.1288     1.6185 
     (0.06)     (0.86) 
Yield     0.0039     0.0024 
     (0.78)     (0.60)    
σ     0.7939     0.5518  
          (9.7664) 
Log likelihood        -99.7575 
LR chi2(11)         26.46***  
       
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.58    GHC 14.00 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 35    GHC 16.30 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 
level. Values in parentheses are t-values. 
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Table II.2 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates when the Gross 
Income is used.  
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     2.6465**    2.1673** 
     (2.28)     (2.31) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1180***    -0.0786** 
     (-2.98)     (-2.50) 
Ownership    1.9623***    1.8349*** 
     (2.71)     (2.74) 
Leaseprice    -0.0568**    -0.0715** 
     (-2.19)     (-0.57) 
Sex     -0.0285    -0.0576 
     (-0.07)     (-0.18) 
Age     0.0071     0.0025 
     (0.91)     (0.39) 
education1    0.0202     0.0407 
     (0.31)     (0.81) 
Familysize    -0.0073    -0.0073 
     (-0.89)     (-1.06) 
Landin     0.1921     0.2186 
     (0.95)     (1.39) 
Waterallocation    0.2058     0.1617 
     (1.03 )       (1.02)     
lngrossincome    -0.0214    0.0495 
     (-0.16)     (0.43) 
Yield     0.0041     0.0025 
     (0.80)     (0.63)    
σ     0.7938     0.5545  
          (9.7795) 
Log likelihood        -100.0338 
LR chi2(11)         25.91***  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.58    GHC 14.00 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 35    GHC 16.33 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table II.3 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
leaseprice = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     8.4833     10.9872*** 
     (1.61)     (2.54) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1289***    -0.0853*** 
     (-3.22)     (-2.69) 
Ownership    0.6705*    0.4129 
     (1.82)     (1.31) 
Sex     -0.2747    -0.3484 
     (-0.67)     (-1.10) 
Age     0.0078     0.0031 
     (0.99)     (0.48) 
education1    0.0246     0.0494 
     (0.37)     (0.97) 
Familysize    -0.0038    -0.0024 
     (-0.42)     (-0.32) 
Landin     0.2555     0.2872 
     (1.25)     (1.82) 
Waterallocation    0.1702     0.1181 
     (0.83 )       (0.73)     
lnofschemeincome   -0.5413    -3.7989** 
     (-1.10)     (-2.01) 
lnschemeincome   1.9859     3.0310 
     (1.08)     (2.03)** 
Yield     0.0036     0.0028 
     (0.70)     (0.69)    
σ     0.8097     0.5606  
          (9.7117) 
Log likelihood        -101.1490 
LR chi2(11)         23.68**  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.27    GHC 13.87 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 19    GHC 16.23 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table II.4 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
ownership = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     7.3430     10.1211** 
     (1.36)     (2.28) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1313***    -0.0849*** 
     (-3.22)     (-2.63) 
Leaseprice    0.0075     -0.0004 
     (0.56)     (-0.03) 
Sex     -0.3594    -0.4190 
     (-0.87)     (-1..31) 
Age     0.0061     0.0022 
     (0.76)     (0.34) 
education1    0.0227     0.0526 
     (0.34)     (1.02) 
Familysize    -0.0037    -0.0031 
     (-0.40)     (-0.41) 
Landin     0.2588     0.2972* 
     (1.24)     (1.85) 
Waterallocation    0.1895     0.1425 
     (0.91 )       (0.87)     
lnoffschemeincome   -1.8938    -3.3340* 
     (-0.80)     (-1.72) 
lnschemeincome   1.4564     2.6546 
     (0.78)     (1.74)* 
Yield     0.0027     0.0021 
     (0.51)     (0.51)    
σ     0.8234     0.5704  
          (9.7590) 
Log likelihood        -101.9812 
LR chi2(11)         22.01**  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.05    GHC 13.71 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 12    GHC 16.13 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 





Table II.5 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
lnschemeincome = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     2.6465**    2.1673** 
     (2.28)     (2.31) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1180***    -0.0786** 
     (-2.98)     (-2.50) 
Ownership    1.9623***    1.8349*** 
     (2.71)     (2.75) 
Leaseprice    -0.0568**    -0.0718** 
     (-2.19)     (-2.56) 
Sex     -0.085     -0.0577 
     (-0.07)     (-0.18) 
Age     0.0071     0.0025 
     (0.91)     (0.39) 
education1    0.0202     0.0407 
     (0.31)     (0.81) 
Familysize    -0.0073    -0.0073 
     (-0.89)     (-1.06) 
Landin     0.1921     0.2186 
     (0.95)     (1.39) 
Waterallocation    0.2058     0.1617 
     (1.03)       (1.02)     
lnoffschemeincome   -0.0214    0.0495 
     (-0.16)     (0.43) 
Yield     0.0041     0.0025 
     (0.80)     (0.63)    
σ     0.7938     0.5544 
          (9.7784) 
Log likelihood        -100.0338 
LR chi2(11)         25.91***  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.58    GHC 14.00 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 35    GHC 16.33 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 





Table II.6 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
leaseprice = 0;  lnoffschemeincome = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     2.8082***    2.4538*** 
     (2.99)     (3.23) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1305***    -0.0897*** 
     (-3.26)     (-2.76) 
Ownership    0.5760     0.2788 
     (1.61)     (0.89) 
Sex     -0.2103    -0.2607 
     (-0.52)     (-0.81) 
Age     0.0076     0.0032 
     (0.96)     (0.348 
education1    0.0155     0.0380 
     (0.24)     (0.73) 
Familysize    -0.0078    -0.0090 
     (-0.94)     (-1.27) 
Landin     0.2421     0.2749* 
     (1.18)     (1.70) 
Waterallocation    0.2043     0.1753 
     (1.01)       (1.07)     
lnschemeincome   -0.0180    0.0436 
     (-0.16)     (0.47) 
Yield     0.003     0.0013 
     (0.53)     (0.31)    
σ     0.8106     0.5792 
          (9.7839) 
Log likelihood        -103.1362 
LR chi2(11)         19.70**  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.18    GHC 13.76 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 08    GHC 16.27 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table II.7 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
leaseprice = 0;  lnschemeincome = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     2.9226**    2.4302** 
     (2.48)     (2.50) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1307***    -0.0904*** 
     (-3.26)     (-2.78) 
Ownership    0.5742     0.2746 
     (1.61)     (0.88) 
Sex     -0.2120    -0.2603 
     (-0.52)     (-0.81) 
Age     0.0076     0.0032 
     (0.96)     (0.48) 
education1    0.0151     0.0371 
     (0.23)     (0.71) 
Familysize    -0.0076    -0.0088 
     (-0.90)     (-1.23) 
Landin     0.2423     0.2772* 
     (1.19)     (1.71) 
Waterallocation    0.2031     0.1745 
     (1.00)       (1.06)     
lnoffschemeincome   -0.0318    0.0408 
     (-0.23)     (0.34) 
Yield     0.0028     0.0013 
     (0.54)     (0.32)    
σ     0.8105     0.5797 
          (9.7932) 
Log likelihood        -103.1857 
LR chi2(11)         19.60**  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.18    GHC 13.77 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 08    GHC 16.29 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table II.8 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
ownership  = 0;  lnoffschemeincome = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     3.1006***    2.6064*** 
     (3.31)     (3.44) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1319***    -0.0878*** 
     (-3.24)     (-2.67) 
Leaseprice    0.0048     -0.0049 
     (0.37)     (-0.40) 
Sex     -0.3021    -0.3230 
     (-0.74)     (-1.01) 
Age     0.0060     0.0021 
     (0.74)     (0.31) 
education1    0.0162     0.0426 
     (0.24)     (0.81) 
Familysize    -0.0066    -0.0086 
     (-0.78)     (-1.21) 
Landin     0.2463     0.2809* 
     (1.18)     (1.72) 
Waterallocation    0.2149     0.1899 
     (1.04)       (1.14)     
lnschemeincome   -0.0365    0.0346 
     (-0.33)     (0.37) 
Yield     0.0021     0.0008 
     (0.40)     (0.20)    
σ     0.8217     0.5847 
          (9.8160) 
Log likelihood        -103.4437 
LR chi2(11)         19.09**  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.01    GHC 13.65 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 04    GHC 16.19 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






Table II.9 OLS Midpoint Estimates of WTP and MLE Interval Estimates (Restriction: 
ownership  = 0;  lnschemeincome = 0) 
 
Variable     OLS     MLE 
Constant     3.2495***    2.5938*** 
     (2.75)     (2.67) 
Locationoffarm   -0.1320***    -0.0883*** 
     (-3.25)     (-2.68) 
Leaseprice    0.0048     -0.0050 
     (0.37)     (-0.41) 
Sex     -0.3040    -0.3224 
     (-0.75)     (-1.01) 
Age     0.0060     0.0021 
     (0.74)     (0.32) 
education1    0.0160     0.0419 
     (0.24)     (0.80) 
Familysize    -0.0064    -0.0085 
     (-0.76)     (-1.18) 
Landin     0.2481     0.2828* 
     (1.19)     (1.73) 
Waterallocation    0.2136     0.1893 
     (1.04)       (1.14)     
lnoffschemeincome   -0.0527    0.0314 
     (-0.38)     (0.26) 
Yield     0.0022     0.0009 
     (0.41)     (0.21)    
σ     0.8216     0.5850 
          (9.8303) 
Log likelihood        -103.4763 
LR chi2(11)         19.02**  
    
Average  
median WTP    GHC 15.01    GHC 13.66 
 
Average  
mean WTP    GHC 21. 04    GHC 16.21 
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 






LABOR DAYS’ REGRESSIONS 
Table II.10 Main OLS and Tobit Estimates of Labor Days  
Variable    OLS     Tobit    
Constant    60.8038*    57.2873* 
    (1.73)     (1.65)     
Locationoffarm  -0. 2910    -0.3121   
    (-1.08)     (-1.19)     
Ownership   5.3660     8.9778     
    (0.94)     (1.25)     
Leaseprice   -0. 2135    -0.4236   
    (-1.11)     (-1.42)     
Sex    -0.1296**    0.2758     
    (-0.05)     (0.10)     
Age    -0.0145    -0.0145    
    (-0.28)     (-0.28)     
education1   0.4657     0.4261    
    (0.98)     (0.91)     
Familysize   0.1181     0.1277**    
    (1.98)     (2.18)     
Landin    0.0185***     -0.0168    
    (0.01)     (-0.01)     
Waterallocation   1.4120     1.0581    
    (1.04 )       (0.80)        
Lnoffschemeincome  -21.0207    -19.8900   
    (-1.37)     (-1.31)  
Lnschemeincome  14.8953    14.1200 
    (1.23)     (1.18) 
Yield    0.0384     0.0391     
    (01.11)    (1.16) 
Log likelihood       -283.9565 
LR chi2(11)        16.29    
  
Average  
median labordays  5.79     5.60    
 
Average  
mean labordays  5.51     5.28  
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 





Table II.11 OLS and Tobit Estimates of Labor Days when Percentage Scheme Income is 
used 
 
Variable    OLS     Tobit    
Constant    29.7339**    27.3874** 
    (2.09)     (1.96)     
Locationoffarm  -0. 2992    -0.3164   
    (-1.10)     (-1.18)     
Ownership   5.4198              10.5858     
    (0.94)     (1.26)     
Leaseprice   -0. 2524    -0.5404   
    (-1.31)     (-1.48)     
Sex    0.6975     1.2175     
    (0.25)     (0.44)     
Age    -0.0157    -0.0170    
    (-0.30)     (-0.32)     
education1   0.4312     0.3866    
    (0.90)     (0.59)     
Familysize   0.0709     0.0865*    
    (1.31)     (1.59)     
Landin    -0.2255     -0.2890    
    (-0.17)     (-0.21)     
Waterallocation   1.8297     1.3999    
    (1.36 )       (1.05)        
Perschemeincome  -30.309**    -28.2255**   
    (-1.96)     (-1.83)     
Yield    0.0279     0.0338    
    (0.81)     (0.87) 
Log likelihood       -285.3563 
LR chi2(11)        13.49    
  
Average  
median labordays  5.50     5.34    
 
Average  
mean labordays  5.51     5.26  
  
Note: *** = significance at 1%  level; ** = significance at 5% level; * = significance at 10% 





APPENDIX III: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, LIKELIHOOD RATIO AND WALD 
TESTS RESULTS 
 
TABLE III.1 SIMPLE CORRELATIONS 
 
 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST RESULTS 
y1: Unrestricted (main) model 
y2: Restricted model (leaseprice =0) 
y3: Restricted model (ownership =0) 
y4: Restricted model (lnoffschemeincome = 0) 
y5: Restricted model (lnschemeincome = 0) 
y6: Restricted model (leaseprice = 0; lnoffschemeincome = 0) 
y7: Restricted model (leaseprice = 0; lnschemeincome = 0) 
y8: Restricted model (ownership = 0; lnoffschemeincome = 0) 
y9: Restricted model (ownership = 0; lnschemeincome = 0) 
 
 
       yield     0.1106   0.0965  -0.0775  -0.0768  -0.4541   0.1683  -0.0568   0.3464   0.6178  -0.0420   0.3974   0.3785   1.0000
lnschemein~e     0.0306  -0.0181  -0.1441  -0.1399  -0.2177   0.2416  -0.1807   0.4261   0.3770  -0.0343   0.9980   1.0000
lnoffschem~e     0.0255  -0.0066  -0.1288  -0.1247  -0.2403   0.2484  -0.1726   0.4535   0.3896  -0.0443   1.0000
wateralloc~n     0.2117  -0.3307   0.0434   0.0171   0.0552  -0.0175  -0.1199  -0.0236  -0.0017   1.0000
      landin     0.1710  -0.0023  -0.0805  -0.1206  -0.2447   0.1963  -0.0887   0.3032   1.0000
  familysize    -0.0295   0.1220   0.0098  -0.0109  -0.3534   0.4079  -0.1248   1.0000
  education1    -0.0283   0.0564   0.1078   0.1174  -0.0462  -0.3824   1.0000
         age     0.0364   0.0831  -0.1883  -0.1888  -0.0846   1.0000
         sex    -0.0441  -0.1845  -0.1135  -0.0212   1.0000
  leaseprice    -0.0104   0.0631   0.8750   1.0000
   ownership     0.1359   0.0031   1.0000
locationof~m    -0.3543   1.0000
  lnmidptwtp     1.0000
                                                                                                                                   
               lnmidp~p locati~m owners~p leasep~e      sex      age educat~1 family~e   landin watera~n lnoffs~e lnsche~e    yield
83 
 
Table III.2(a) LR Test Results with One Variable Restriction  
LR Test  LR chi2(1)  Prob>chi2   Comment 
 
y2 nested in y1 5.40   0.0201    Reject Ho  
y3 nested in y1 7.06   0.0079    Reject Ho 
y4 nested in y1 3.07   0.080    Reject Ho  




Table III.2(b) LR Test Results with Two Variables Restriction  
LR Test  LR chi2(2)  Prob>chi2   Comment 
 
y6 nested in y1  9.38   0.0092    Reject Ho 
y7 nested in y1 9.47   0.0088    Reject Ho 
y8 nested in y1 9.99   0.0068    Reject Ho 










WALD TEST RESULTS 
Table III.3 Wald Test Results  
Wald Test     LR chi2 Prob>chi2 Comment 
 
 Ownership and leaseprice   7.29  0.0261  Reject Ho 
Lnoffschemeincome & lnschemeincome 3.41  0.1822  Fail to reject Ho 
Lnoffschemeincome     3.08  0.0791  Reject Ho 
Lnschemeincome    3.19  0.0739  Reject Ho 
Ownership      7.23  0.0072  Reject Ho 
Leaseprice     4.92  0.0265  Reject Ho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
